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The strategyproof classiﬁcation problem deals with a setting where a decision maker must
classify a set of input points with binary labels, while minimizing the expected error. The
labels of the input points are reported by self-interested agents, who might lie in order to
obtain a classiﬁer that more closely matches their own labels, thereby creating a bias in
the data; this motivates the design of truthful mechanisms that discourage false reports.
In this paper we give strategyproof mechanisms for the classiﬁcation problem in two
restricted settings: (i) there are only two classiﬁers, and (ii) all agents are interested in a
shared set of input points. We show that these plausible assumptions lead to strong positive
results. In particular, we demonstrate that variations of a random dictator mechanism, that
are truthful, can guarantee approximately optimal outcomes with respect to any family of
classiﬁers. Moreover, these results are tight in the sense that they match the best possible
approximation ratio that can be guaranteed by any truthful mechanism.
We further show how our mechanisms can be used for learning classiﬁers from sampled
data, and provide PAC-style generalization bounds on their expected error. Interestingly,
our results can be applied to problems in the context of various ﬁelds beyond classiﬁcation,
including facility location and judgment aggregation.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Consider a learning algorithm, which takes a labeled set of samples (“training data”) as input, and outputs a binary clas-
siﬁer. The training data, typically hand-constructed by human experts, is supposed to reﬂect the knowledge of the experts
on the current domain. The basic requirement from such an algorithm is to guarantee that the output classiﬁer minimizes
the number of classiﬁcation errors with respect to the ‘truth’ (according to the domain experts). Standard machine-learning
literature studies the performance of such algorithms given various distributions and concept classes (e.g., linear classiﬁers),
sparse or noisy data, etc.
However in many real-life situations, the experts have a personal interest in the outcome of the algorithm, and therefore
they cannot be assumed to be truthful. If an expert can bias the learned classiﬁer in her favor by lying, then the reported
training data will no longer reﬂect the properties of the domain (or even the properties of the real training data). Optimizing
a classiﬁer based on such corrupted data may result in a very poor classiﬁer, regardless of the guarantees supplied by
learning theory (which assumes truthfulness).
We consider two interrelated settings. The ﬁrst setting is decision-theoretic; a decision must be made based on data
reported by multiple self-interested agents. The agents are concerned with the binary labels of a set of input points. Put
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distribution. The utility of an agent with respect to a given decision (i.e., a given classiﬁer) is the number of points on
which the label provided by the classiﬁer agrees with the agent’s own label. The goal of the decision maker is to choose a
classiﬁer that maximizes the social welfare—the sum of utilities. As we will see, results in this setting can also be applied
to problems in the context of various other ﬁelds, including facility location and judgment aggregation.
The second setting is learning-theoretic, a variation of the standard Supervised Classiﬁcation problem. Samples are drawn
from some distribution over the input space, and are then labeled by experts. A classiﬁcation mechanism receives the
sampled data as input, and outputs a classiﬁer. Unlike the standard setting in machine learning (but similarly to our ﬁrst
setting), the experts are assumed to be self-interested agents, and may lie in order to increase their utility. This setting
may seem far more involved than the ﬁrst, as it deals with generalization from partial data (the dataset) to the underlying
distribution. However, we show that under the standard assumptions of learning theory, the learning problem effectively
reduces to ﬁnding a classiﬁer that best ﬁts the available data (i.e., to the ﬁrst setting, above).
In both settings the decision maker (or mechanism, or learning algorithm) aims to ﬁnd a classiﬁer that classiﬁes the
available data as well as possible. However, the agents may misreport their labels in an attempt to inﬂuence the ﬁnal
decision in their favor. The result of a decision making process based on such biased data may be completely unexpected
and diﬃcult to analyze. A truthful learning mechanism eliminates any such bias and allows the decision maker to select a
classiﬁer that best ﬁts the reported data, without having to take into account the hidden interests of the agents. In other
words, once we guarantee that agents are telling the truth, we may concentrate on the more standard goal of minimizing
the error. In order to obtain truthfulness, however, we may need to trade off optimality. Our goal is to provide mechanisms
that are both truthful and approximately optimal in terms of social welfare.
1.1. Restrictions on the domain
In recent work [29] we showed that in an unrestricted domain, it is effectively impossible to design truthful mechanisms
that are close to optimal. This motivates the investigation of restricted domains. In this paper we consider several such
restrictions, described below.
1.1.1. Restricting the concept class: two functions
A seemingly simple case is when the concept class contains only two functions. This is equivalent to a (binary) decision
that has to be made based on data points that are controlled by multiple (possibly) selﬁsh agents, where the decision
affects all the agents. The decision maker would like to make a decision which is consistent, as much as possible, with all
the available data. However, in our strategic setting the agents might misreport their data in an attempt to inﬂuence the
ﬁnal decision in their favor.
As a motivating example, consider a decision that has to be made by the Workers’ committee of the TAs in the Hebrew
University, regarding an ongoing strike. Each member of the committee (who represents one department) announces how
many TAs in his/her department support the strike, and how many oppose it. A ﬁnal decision is made based on total
support for the strike. Suppose that 60% of the economics department opposes the strike. However, the representative of
the economics department majors in game theory. She therefore knows that for the beneﬁt of the majority of TAs in her
department, it would be better to state that everybody objects to the strike.2
1.1.2. Restricting the dataset: shared inputs
Our main conceptual contribution in this paper, which leads to strong positive results, is the assumption of shared inputs.
In the decision-theoretic setting, this means that the agents share the same set of input points, and only disagree on the
labels of these points. In the learning-theoretic setting, the shared inputs assumption implies that the agents are interested
in a common distribution over the input space, but, once again, differ with respect to the labels.
The ﬁrst restriction we described did not address the issue of shared inputs. However, as the two possible classiﬁers
are constant, the identity of the input points (i.e., their location) is irrelevant—only their labels matter. Hence, the ﬁrst
restriction is in fact a very special case of the latter (see also footnote 17).
As the shared inputs assumption is a weaker restriction than assuming two functions, the guarantees are also somewhat
weaker. Nevertheless, they hold with respect to any concept class. We believe that in many environments the requirement of
shared inputs is satisﬁed. As an example, consider a large organization that is trying to ﬁght congestion in an internal email
system by designing a smart spam ﬁlter. In order to train the system, managers are asked to review the last 1000 emails
sent to the “all employees” mailing list (hence, shared inputs) and classify them as either “work-related” (positive label) or
“spam” (negative label). Whereas the managers will likely agree on the classiﬁcation of some of the messages (e.g., “Buy
Viagra now!!!” or “Christmas Bonus for all employees”), it is likely that others (e.g., “Joe from the Sales department goes on
a lunch break”) would not be unanimously classiﬁed. Moreover, as each manager is interested in ﬁltering most of what he
sees as spam, a manager might try to compensate for the “mistakes” of his colleagues by misreporting his real opinion with
2 In an attempt to avoid such misrepresentation, major decisions usually require a gathering of all TAs, and the use of a standard voting procedure.
However, most decisions are taken with a much narrower quorum.
R. Meir et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 186 (2012) 123–156 125respect to some cases. For example, the manager of the R&D department, believing that about 90% of the Sales messages are
utterly unimportant, might classify all of them as spam in order to reduce the congestion. The manager of Sales, suspecting
the general opinion on her department, might do the exact opposite to prevent her e-mails from being ﬁltered. The fact
that some users may not have a full understanding of the learning algorithm, does not necessarily prevent them from trying
to bias it anyway. Even if their strategy is not optimal for them, it still contaminates the data.
Interestingly, our model for binary classiﬁcation with shared inputs is equivalent to models that have been suggested in
the literature for problems in seemingly unrelated domains, including judgment aggregation, partition aggregation, facility
location, and voting (for a more detailed comparison, see Section 1.3 and discussion).
One such common classiﬁcation/partition problem is deciding on the operating hours of a shared resource. As a concrete
example, consider a building with a central heating system (such buildings are common in Jerusalem and in many cities of
Europe). Every tenant has certain hours in which he wants the heat to be on (e.g., always on when he is home, and off
otherwise, since the cost is shared by all tenants). The household fee is the same for all tenants, and thus there is no transfer
of payoffs. A “classiﬁer” is a partition of the day (or week) to on and off intervals. Furthermore, there are constraints on the
ﬁnal partition; for example, on intervals must be at least 3 hours long to achieve better eﬃciency.
1.1.3. Realizable datasets
In some cases, learning is facilitated if we know that there is at least one “perfect” classiﬁer in our concept class (that is,
a classiﬁer that separates all positive data points in the dataset from the negative ones). Such datasets are called realizable.
It is therefore possible that the labels of each agent will be realizable, even if there is no single classiﬁer that is perfect for
all agents. We study how realizability, which can be seen as another restriction on the dataset, affects the optimality of the
proposed mechanisms in the context of shared input.
1.2. Overview of our results
We wish to design classiﬁcation mechanisms that achieve a good outcome in the face of strategic behavior. By “good
outcome” we mean that the output of the mechanism provides an approximation of the optimal solution.3 We would also
like our mechanisms to be strategyproof (SP), that is, the agents must not be able to beneﬁt from lying. These two key
requirements are formalized and demonstrated with examples in Section 2.
We begin by presenting mechanisms for the two-function problem in Section 3. The results of this section serve two
purposes. First, the tight worst-case analysis of SP mechanisms provides a full picture of their power and limitations in the
binary decision-making setting. Second, the focus on a simple setting allows us to explain in detail subtle issues that are
also important for the next, more general, setting.
We put forward a simple deterministic decision-making mechanism which is group strategyproof (i.e., even coalitions
of agents do not gain from lying) and gives a 3-approximation of the optimal global risk; in other words, the number
of mislabeled points is at most 3 times the minimum number. Moreover, we show that no deterministic strategyproof
mechanism can do better. Interestingly, we circumvent this result by designing a strategyproof randomized mechanism that
gives a 2-approximation, and further demonstrate that this is as far as randomization can take us.
In Section 4, we turn to study the more general case, under the shared inputs assumption. We ﬁrst show that SP de-
terministic mechanisms cannot guarantee a sublinear approximation ratio. We show that choosing a dictator at random
provides an approximation ratio of 3 in expectation, even if agents have weights, i.e., the decision mechanism values some
agents more than others (in that case we randomly select a dictator according to the weights). We then drive the approx-
imation even lower by using a non-trivial selection of the dictator, matching it with the known lower bound of 3 − 2n ; it
is quite striking that these results hold with respect to any concept class. In addition, we show that when datasets are
realizable, an even better approximation ratio (of 2− 2n ) can be guaranteed.
In each section we further show how the suggested mechanisms for the decision-theoretic setting can be further ex-
ploited to attain similar approximation results in the learning-theoretic setting. We observe that in the learning-theoretic
setting, designing strategyproof mechanisms is virtually impossible, since there is an additional element of randomness in-
troduced by sampling the input space. We therefore relax the strategyproof requirements, and instead investigate each of
two incomparable strategic assumptions: that agents do not lie if they cannot gain more than ; and that agents always use
a dominant strategy if one exists with respect to a speciﬁc sample. We show that under either assumption our randomized
mechanisms can be run directly on sampled data while maintaining a bounded expected error. Our theorems give a connec-
tion between the number of samples and the expected error of the mechanism in each case, in the spirit of PAC-learning
algorithms [40].
1.2.1. Mechanisms with payments
An important remark is that in the strategyproof classiﬁcation setting, standard economic money-based mechanisms such
as the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism (see, e.g., [32]) can be used to obtain good results. However, our setting
3 Approximation algorithms are frequently used in various domains in computer science in order to overcome computational barriers. While we largely
ignore issues of computational complexity, optimal algorithms are typically not strategyproof; hence, the need for approximation.
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resorting to payments is highly desirable, since often payments cannot be made due to legal or ethical considerations.
Moreover, in Internet environments VCG style payments are notoriously diﬃcult to implement, due to banking and security
issues. Hence, we follow the example set by previous work on strategyproof learning models (e.g., [10], see below) by
considering approximation mechanisms that do not require payments.
1.3. Related work
This paper lies at the intersection of several areas, including mechanism design, judgment aggregation, and learning. We
cluster the related work by areas.
1.3.1. Approximate mechanism design without money
Mechanisms that deal with strategic behavior of agents have been proposed recently for a large range of applications.
While certain restrictions may allow the design of optimal SP mechanisms [39], often this is not the case, and approximation
is required. This observation gave rise to the agenda of approximate mechanism design without money (AMDw/oM).
Below, we overview some SP mechanisms for machine learning problems in detail, and compare them to our work.
These, however, constitute just one facet of the large variety of problems to which AMDw/oM can be applied. Approximate
mechanisms without payments have been proposed for facility location, matching [3,15], resource allocation [18,19,33],
scheduling [23], and even auctions [20].
1.3.2. Strategyproof learning algorithms
The work most closely related to ours is a paper by Dekel et al. [10]. Their work focused on regression learning, where
the labels are real numbers and one is interested in the distances between the mechanism’s outputs and the labels. Except
for this very signiﬁcant difference, the settings that we study and our goals are very similar to theirs. Dekel et al. provided
upper and lower bounds on the approximation ratio achieved by supervised regression mechanisms in this model. Notably,
some of our bounds resemble the bounds in their regression setting. Moreover, similar intuitions sometimes apply to both
settings, although it seems the results of one setting cannot be analytically mapped to the other. Dekel et al. also concentrate
on mechanisms without payments, but their results hold only with respect to very speciﬁc function classes (as they do not
assume shared inputs; see, e.g., Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 of [10]). We also demand weaker assumptions for some of our
generalization theorems, thereby allowing for stronger results.
Strategyproof regression has also been studied by Perote-Peña and Perote [34]. They suggested several mechanisms and
compared them to naive learning algorithms in a strategic setting. Unlike Dekel et al., they evaluated their mechanisms
empirically rather than analytically, with respect to some speciﬁc assumptions on the strategic behavior of the agents.
Another rather closely related work by the same authors has results of a negative ﬂavor. Perote and Perote-Peña [35]
put forward a model of unsupervised clustering, where each agent controls a single point in R2 (i.e., its reported location).
A clustering mechanism aggregates these locations and outputs a partition and a set of centroids. They show that if every
agent wants to be close to some centroid, then under very weak restrictions on the clustering mechanism there always
exists a beneﬁcial manipulation, that is, there are no reasonable (deterministic) clustering mechanisms that are SP.
1.3.3. Judgment and partition aggregation
While the motivation for our model stems from the binary classiﬁcation problem in machine learning, very similar models
have been used to describe various problems of judgment aggregation. In particular, a list of binary issues that must be
decided upon is essentially equivalent to a dataset with binary labels. Similarly, a suggestion to split a ﬁnite set into two
parts can also be replaced with labels for each element in the set.
Properties of mechanisms for judgment/partition aggregation have been discussed extensively in the literature since
the 1970s [42,30,24,5,16]. A recent paper that deals explicitly with manipulations is by Dokow and Holzman [14], which
characterizes strategyproof aggregation rules (that can also be interpreted as classiﬁcation mechanisms in our framework).
Our current work differs in two important ways from the literature on judgment aggregation. First, we explicitly measure
the quality of proposed mechanisms (in the spirit of AMDw/oM), which enables us to compare SP mechanisms to one
another. Second, we study not only deterministic mechanisms, but also randomized ones. We believe that the notion of
approximation, and the use of randomization (both a common practice in computer science) can also contribute to the
study of more “standard” judgment aggregation settings. The current paper is a demonstration of this approach.
1.3.4. Facility location
In the facility location problem, agents report their location (usually in some metric space), and the mechanism outputs
a location for a facility that is close, on average, to all agents. SP location mechanisms for various topologies have been
suggested and studied (see, e.g., [1,26,36], which also provides a clear overview of the ﬁeld).
Consider a dataset labeled by several agents, and a binary cube whose dimensions correspond to the samples in the
dataset. It is not hard to verify that classiﬁcation with shared inputs is equivalent to facility location on the binary cube,
where the label vector of each agent corresponds directly to a speciﬁc vertex of this cube. Similarly, any concept class (which
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mechanism then seeks the optimal classiﬁcation (i.e., the optimal vertex) within this restricted set.
Although our main focus in the context of binary classiﬁcation is the binary cube, all of our mechanisms in this paper
can be directly applied to facility location problems in any metric space.
An important note is that it is typically assumed that the set of allowed locations for the facility coincides with the
possible locations of the agents. This is equivalent to the assumption of realizability in our classiﬁcation model. We study SP
mechanisms both with and without this assumption.
1.3.5. Voting
A ﬁnite set of classiﬁers can also be thought of as a class of candidates in a voting scenario, where the experts are casting
the votes. While such a perspective is sometimes useful (see, for example, [29]), the preferences in voting are typically much
more expressive.
We can, however, model any preference proﬁle with a proper input space. Suppose that we have a set of candidates;
consider the binary cube from the last section, where every dimension (i.e., a sample in the dataset) corresponds to a
pair of candidates. The allowed set of vertices (i.e., the concept class) restricts the outcome to vertices that correspond to a
linear order over the candidates. The assumption of realizability in this setting is interpreted as rationality of the voters. The
optimal classiﬁcation mechanism, which minimizes the average distance to all voters, is equivalent to the Kemeny–Young
voting rule [22]. Therefore, SP classiﬁcation mechanisms can be interpreted in this setting as strategyproof approximations
of the Kemeny–Young rule. It is important to note, however, that strategyproofness in our model does not coincide with the
similar requirement in voting (as in the typical voting setting only the identity of the winner is considered).
1.3.6. Other related work
There is a signiﬁcant body of work on learning in the face of noise, where the noise can be either random or adversarial
(see, e.g., [6,25]). Dalvi [9], and Dekel and Shamir [11] study settings more similar to ours, where the learning process is
modeled as a game between a classiﬁer and an adversary. However, in these papers the goal is to do well in the face of
noisy or biased data, rather than provide incentives in a way that prevents the dataset from being manipulated in the ﬁrst
place.
Further aﬁeld, it is worth mentioning several examples from the literature that apply machine learning techniques in
order to resolve problems in economics or game theory. Balcan et al. [4] apply SP machine learning algorithms to learn
bidders’ valuations in auctions. However, the authors achieve truthfulness by learning from agents that are not directly
inﬂuenced by the outcome that relies on their reported data. This is not possible in our setting, as all agents are affected by
the selected classiﬁer. Other papers such as Procaccia et al. [37] suggest learning algorithms that enable better preference
aggregation, but do not consider strategic behavior of the society. Finally, there has been some recent work on automated
mechanism design using techniques from machine learning [7,8]. Although the designed mechanisms are required to be
truthful, the learning algorithm itself does not handle private information, and thus truthfulness is irrelevant.
2. Model and notations
We start by introducing our model and notations for the decision-theoretic setting; additional deﬁnitions for the
learning-theoretic setting are given subsequently.
2.1. Binary classiﬁcation with multiple experts
Let X be an input space, which we assume to be either a ﬁnite set or some subset of Rd . A classiﬁer or concept c is a
function c :X → {+,−} from the input space to the labels {+,−}. A concept class C is a set of such concepts. For example,
the class of linear separators over Rd is the set of concepts that are deﬁned by the parameters a ∈ Rd and b ∈ R, and map
a point x ∈Rd to + if and only if a · x+ b 0.
Denote the set of agents by I = {1, . . . ,n}, n  2. The agents are interested in a (ﬁnite) set of k data points X ∈ X k . In
this paper we assume that X is shared among the agents, that is, all the agents are equally interested in each data point
in X . This plausible assumption, as we shall see, allows us to obtain surprisingly strong results. Naturally, the points in X
are common knowledge.
Each agent has a private type: its labels for the points in X . Speciﬁcally, agent i ∈ I holds a function Yi : X → {+,−},
which maps every point x ∈ X to the label Yi(x) that i attributes to x. Each agent i ∈ I is also assigned a weight wi , which
reﬂects its relative importance; by normalizing the weights we can assume that
∑
i∈I wi = 1. Let
Si =
{〈
x, Yi(x)
〉
: x ∈ X}
be the partial dataset of agent i, and let S = 〈S1, . . . , Sn〉 denote the complete dataset. Si is said to be realizable w.r.t. a
concept class C if there is c ∈ C which perfectly separates the positive samples from the negative ones. If Si is realizable for
all i ∈ I , then S is said to be individually realizable. Fig. 1 shows an example of a dataset with a shared set of points X .
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identical, but the labels, i.e., their types, are different. The best classiﬁer from C with respect to each Si is also shown (the arrow marks the positive
halfspace of the separator). Only the rightmost dataset is realizable.
We use the common 0–1 loss function to measure the error. The risk,4 or negative utility, of agent i ∈ I with respect to
a concept c is simply the relative number of errors that c makes on its dataset. Formally,
Ri(c, S) = 1
k
∑
〈x,y〉∈Si

c(x) = y= 1
k
∑
x∈X

c(x) = Yi(x)

, (1)
where [[A]] denotes the indicator function of the boolean expression A. Note that Si is realizable if and only if
minc∈C Ri(c, S) = 0. In contrast to most standard learning scenarios, in our model there is no “ground truth”, and the
objective is to classify in a way that will be most satisfactory to the agents. Thus the global risk is deﬁned as
RI (c, S) =
∑
i∈I
wi · Ri(c, S) = 1
k
∑
i∈I
∑
x∈X
wi ·

c(x) = Yi(x)

. (2)
2.2. Mechanism properties
A deterministic mechanism M receives as input a dataset S ,5 and outputs a classiﬁer c ∈ C . Note that since S is ﬁnite, there
are only ﬁnitely many different ways to classify the data; thus, Ri(M(S), S) for all i ∈ I and RI (M(S), S) are well-deﬁned.
This will no longer be the case in the learning-theoretic setting, where we will need to slightly modify our deﬁnitions.
A randomized mechanism is identiﬁed with a probability distribution pM over S × C . We restrict our attention to proba-
bilities with a ﬁnite support. That is, for every dataset S , the mechanism M returns c ∈ C , with a probability of pM(c | S).
When measuring the risk, we are interested in the expected number of errors that the mechanism makes on the given
dataset. Formally,
Ri
(
M(S), S
)= EpM[Ri(c, S) ∣∣ S]=∑
c∈C
pM(c | S) · Ri(c, S), (3)
and the global risk is deﬁned analogously.
For any (complete or partial) dataset S ′ ⊆ S , the best available classiﬁer with respect to the dataset S ′ is referred to as
the empirical risk minimizer (erm)—a common term in the machine learning literature. Formally,
erm
(
S ′
)= argmin
c∈C
∑
〈x,y〉∈S ′

c(x) = y. (4)
For the complete dataset, we denote the best classiﬁer by c∗(S), and its risk by r∗(S) (or simply c∗, r∗ if S is clear from the
context). That is,
c∗(S) = erm(S) = argmin
c∈C
RI (c, S)
and r∗(S) = RI (c∗(S), S).
The simple mechanism that always computes and returns erm(S) is referred to as the ERM mechanism (with block
letters).6 If there is more than one optimal classiﬁer, we assume that ERM returns one of them arbitrarily. Similarly, a mech-
anism which returns the best classiﬁer with respect to a partial dataset of a speciﬁc agent (e.g., erm(S1)) is called a dictator
mechanism.
If r∗ = 0 then c∗ is said to be perfect. Note that the existence of a perfect classiﬁer in C implies that all partial datasets
are realizable, but the converse does not hold.
We measure the quality of the outcome of a mechanism using the standard notion of multiplicative approximation.
4 When the dataset S consists of sampled data, the appropriate term is empirical risk. This distinction will become signiﬁcant in Sections 3.3 and 4.3.
5 We implicitly assume that information regarding the weights of the agents is contained in the dataset.
6 Actual algorithms to compute the erm may raise various practical problems that depend on the domain, such as computational complexity. However,
such problems are not within the scope of this paper. Since an erm always exists and the number of data points is ﬁnite, there is an algorithm that
computes an erm in ﬁnite time.
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Note that randomized mechanisms are only required to attain approximation in expectation, and not necessarily with high
probability.
We emphasize that the real labels of the input points are private information, and an agent may report different labels
than the ones indicated by Yi . We denote by Y i : X → {+,−} the reported labels of agent i. We also denote by Si =
{〈x, Y i(x)〉: x ∈ X} the reported partial dataset of agent i, and by S = 〈S1, . . . , Sn〉 the reported dataset.
Strategyproofness implies that reporting the truthful types is a dominant strategy for all agents. For a dataset S and i ∈ I ,
let S−i be the complete dataset without the partial dataset of agent i.
Deﬁnition 2.2. A (deterministic or randomized) mechanism M is strategyproof (SP) if for every dataset S , for every i ∈ I , and
for every Si ,
Ri
(
M(S), S
)
 Ri
(
M(Si, S−i), S
)
. (5)
Our goal is to design mechanisms that are both SP and guarantee a low worst-case approximation ratio.
There is an inherent tradeoff between strategyproofness and good approximation. The ERM mechanism (which always
returns erm(S)), for example, is a 1-approximation mechanism, but is not SP (as we show in the next section). On the other
hand, a mechanism that selects agent 1 as a dictator, and returns erm(S1), is clearly SP but in general may give a very bad
approximation (e.g., if all other agents disagree with agent 1).
We remark that for randomized mechanisms, some make a distinction between strategyproofness in expectation (as
Deﬁnition 2.2 implies), and universal strategyproofness. The latter, stronger deﬁnition requires that an agent cannot gain from
lying even after the randomization takes place. Interestingly, the ﬁrst, weaker notion of strategyproofness is suﬃcient for
our lower bounds, but our upper bounds satisfy universal strategyproofness.
3. Choosing from two classiﬁers
In this section we consider a very simple concept class, containing only two classiﬁers. For ease of exposition we assume
that there is a positive classiﬁer c+ and a negative classiﬁer c− , such that c+(x) = “ + ”, c−(x) = “ − ” for any x ∈ X . Our
concept class C = {c+, c−} can be thought of as choosing between a global positive decision and negative decision, respectively.
Remark 1. Although we deﬁne our concept class C as containing two speciﬁc classiﬁers, our results easily extend to every
concept class of size 2 (provided that there is at least one data point x ∈ X on which the two concepts disagree). Indeed,
the part of the dataset on which the concepts agree can only improve the approximation ratio, and on the other hand we
can always give examples where all data points are in conﬂict. Thus both upper and lower bounds still hold.
We start with some observations that will allow us to simplify our model in this setting. Note that the identity of each
data point is not important, only the fraction of positive and negative labels that each agent attributes to the dataset. We
can also think of this setting as if each agent controls a different set of points Xi , where the size of each such partial dataset
is proportional to the agent’s weight. With this interpretation our model becomes even simpler, as both the weight and the
type of each agent are completely deﬁned by the number of “positive points” and “negative points” it controls.
Consider our TA committee example from the introduction. We can count each TA as a single data point (which is
positive if it supports the strike), and the representative of each department reports the opinions of all TAs. The weight of
department in this case would be proportional to the number of workers.
We denote the number of points controlled by agent i by mi = |Xi| = |Si |, and the size of the full dataset by m = |S| =∑
i∈I mi . This notation will be used in this section instead of k. We further denote the number of positive and negative data
points by Pi = |{〈x, y〉 ∈ Si: y = +}|, and Ni = mi − Pi = |{〈x, y〉 ∈ Si: y = −}|. For convenience we also let P = ∑i∈I P i ,
N =∑i∈I Ni . We emphasize that {Pi,Ni}i∈I contains all the information relevant to our problem and can thus replace S .
With these alternative notations, the private risk of concept c for agent i is the same as in Eq. (1), only replacing k
with mi . The risk is further simpliﬁed in the two-function case:
Ri(c, S) = 1
mi
∑
〈x,y〉∈Si

c(x) = y=
{
Pi/mi, if c = c−,
Ni/mi, if c = c+. (6)
We update the deﬁnition of the global risk as follows:
RI (c, S) =
∑
i∈I
mi
m
Ri(c, S) = 1
m
∑
〈x,y〉∈S

c(x) = y. (7)
Similarly to the private risk, RI (c, S) is either P/m (for c−) or N/m (for c+). Note that by taking wi = mim , this is a special
case of Eq. (2).
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Unfortunately, if we choose ERM as our mechanism, then even in this simple setting the agents may lie in order to
decrease their subjective risk.
Example 3.1 (Illustrated in Fig. 2). Agent 1 controls 3 examples: 2 positive and 1 negative. Agent 2 controls 2 examples, both
negative. Since there is a majority of negative examples, ERM would return c−; agent 1 would suffer a subjective risk of 2/3.
On the other hand, if agent 1 reported his negative example to be positive as well, ERM would return c+ , with a subjective
risk of only 1/3 for agent 1. Indeed, note that an agent’s utility is measured with respect to its real labels, rather than with
respect to the reported labels.
It is easy to see, however, that an agent cannot gain by lying when it only controls one point. For instance, if an agent
has a positive point and ERM returns c− , falsely reporting a negative label will only reinforce the mechanism’s decision.
This is in striking contrast to the regression learning setting considered in Dekel et al. [10], where the deepest technical
results concern the single-point-per-agent scenario.
Despite the fact that ERM is not SP, we would still like to use the optimal concept in order to evaluate other concepts
and mechanisms. From the deﬁnition of the erm, we have that
r∗ = RI
(
c∗, S
)=min{RI (c+, S),RI (c−, S)}=min{N
m
,
P
m
}
.
3.1. Deterministic mechanisms
Denote by ci the erm on Si , i.e., ci = c+ if Pi  Ni and c− otherwise. Clearly ci is the best classiﬁer agent i can hope for.
Consider the mechanism given as Mechanism 1.
Mechanism 1 the Projected Majority mechanism (PM)
Based on the labels of each agent Pi ,Ni , calculate ci . Deﬁne each agent as a negative agent if ci = c− , and as a positive agent if ci = c+ .
Denote by P ′ =∑i:ci=c+ mi the number of examples that belong to positive agents, and similarly N ′ =∑i:ci=c− mi =m− P ′ .
if P ′  N ′ then return c+ .
else return c− .
end if
Remark 2. Informally we state that in our current setting, we can obtain similar approximation results even under mech-
anisms that are not SP, assuming agents lie only when this is beneﬁcial to them. Nevertheless, strategyproofness gives us
a very clean framework to analyze mechanisms in the face of strategic behavior. When we discuss our learning theoretic
framework, where obtaining strategyproofness is next to impossible, we shall apply the former, less elegant, type of analysis.
We will show that this mechanism has the excellent game-theoretic property of being group strategyproof : no coalition
of players can gain by lying. In other words, if some agent in the coalition strictly gains from the joint lie, some other agent
in the coalition must strictly lose. While technically simple, this ﬁrst result demonstrates the key principles of strategyproof
mechanisms.
Theorem 3.2.Mechanism 1 is a 3-approximation group-SP mechanism.
Proof. We ﬁrst show group strategyproofness. Let B ⊆ I . We can assume without loss of generality that either all agents in
B are positive or all of them are negative, since a positive (resp., negative) agent cannot gain from lying if the mechanism
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false labels. The same goes for agent 2 regarding datasets I and II.
returns c+ (resp., c−). Again without loss of generality, the agents are all positive. Therefore, if some agent is to beneﬁt from
lying, the mechanism has to return c− on the truthful dataset. However, since the mechanism considers all agents in B to
be positive agents when the truthful dataset is given, an agent in B can only hope to inﬂuence the outcome by reporting a
majority of negative examples. However, this only increases N ′ , reinforcing the mechanism’s decision to return c− .
It remains to demonstrate that the approximation ratio is as claimed. We assume without loss of generality that the
mechanism returned c+ , i.e., P ′  N ′ . We ﬁrst prove that if the mechanism returned the positive concept, at least 1/4 of
the examples are indeed positive, that is, P  14m.
Indeed, clearly P ′  m2  N ′ otherwise we would get c = c− . Now, if an agent is positive (ci = c+), at least half of its
examples are also positive. Thus
P =
∑
i∈I
P i 
∑
i:ci=c+
Pi 
∑
i:ci=c+
mi
2
= P
′
2
,
and hence P  P ′2 
m
4 .
Now, we know that P + N =m, so N =m − P m − (m4 ) = 3m4  3P . Clearly if the mechanism decided “correctly”, i.e.,
P m/2, then
RI (c, S) = RI (c+, S) = N
m
= r∗.
Otherwise, if P <m/2, then
RI (c, S) = RI (c+, S) = N
m
 3 P
m
= 3RI (c−, S) = 3r∗.
In any case we have that RI (c, S) 3r∗ , proving that Mechanism 1 is indeed a 3-approximation mechanism. 
As 3-approximation is achieved by such a trivial mechanism, we would naturally like to know whether it is possible to
get a better approximation ratio, without waiving the SP property. We show that this is not the case by proving a matching
lower bound on the best possible approximation ratio achievable by an SP mechanism. Note that the lower bound only
requires strategyproofness, not group strategyproofness.
Theorem 3.3. Let  > 0. There is no (3− )-approximation strategyproof mechanism.
Proof. To prove the bound, we present 3 different datasets. We show that any SP mechanism must return the same result
on all of them, while neither concept in C yields an approximation ratio of (3− ) in all three.
Let  > 0. We will use I = {1,2}, and an integer t = t() to be deﬁned later. Note that in all three datasets m1 =m2 =
2t + 1. We deﬁne the three datasets as follows (see Fig. 3 for an illustration):
• S I : P1 = 2t + 1,N1 = 0; P2 = t,N2 = t + 1,
• SII: P1 = 2t + 1, N1 = 0; P2 = 0, N2 = 2t + 1,
• SIII: P1 = t + 1, N1 = t; P2 = 0, N2 = 2t + 1.
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M(S I ) = c+ and M(SII) = c− . Notice that the only difference between the two settings is agent 2’s labels. If agent 2’s
truthful labels are as in S I , his subjective erm is c− . Therefore, he can report his labels to be as in SII (i.e., all negative) and
obtain c− . Now, if M(S I ) = c− and M(SII) = c+ , agent 2 can gain by deviating from SII to S I . A symmetric argument, with
respect to agent 1 (that in all settings prefers c+) shows that M(SII) =M(SIII).
So, without loss of generality assume that c =M(S I ) =M(SII) =M(SIII) = c+ (otherwise, symmetric arguments yield the
same result). Therefore:
RI
(
c, SIII
)= RI(c+, SIII)= N1 + N2
m
= 3t + 1
4t + 2 . (8)
On the other hand, the negative concept is much better:
r∗ = RI
(
c−, SIII
)= t + 1
4t + 2 .
By combining the last two equations:
RI (c, SIII)
r∗
=
3t+1
4t+2
t+1
4t+2
= 3t + 1
t + 1 .
Let us set t > 3 ; then the last expression is strictly greater than 3−  , and thus RI (c, SIII) > (3− )r∗ . We conclude that any
SP mechanism cannot have an approximation ratio of 3−  . 
3.2. Randomized mechanisms
What if we let our mechanism ﬂip coins? Can we ﬁnd an SP randomized mechanism that beats (in expectation) the
3-approximation deterministic lower bound? To answer the question we ﬁrst recall the deﬁnition of the risk of such a
mechanism given in (3).
For our simple concept class C = {c+, c−}, a randomized mechanism is deﬁned only by the probability of returning a
positive or negative concept, given S . Accordingly, the risk (both private and global) is
R
(
M(S), S
)= p+ · R(c+, S) + p− · R(c−, S),
where p+, p− stand for pM(c+ | S) and pM(c− | S).
We start our investigation of SP randomized mechanisms by establishing a lower bound of 2 on their approximation
ratio.
Theorem 3.4. Let  > 0. There is no (2− )-approximation strategyproof randomized mechanism.
The proof, along with all the remaining proofs of this section, appears in Appendix A.
We presently put forward a randomized SP 2-approximation mechanism, thereby matching the lower bound with an
upper bound. However we ﬁrst propose a simpler mechanism and analyze where it fails: The natural thing to do would be
to calculate P ′ and N ′ as in our deterministic Projected Majority Mechanism and then simply to select c+ with probability
P ′/m and c− with probability N ′/m. We refer to this simple mechanism as the weighted random dictator mechanism (WRD),
for reasons that will become apparent in Section 4.1.7 Unfortunately, this simple randomization (which is clearly SP) cannot
even beat the deterministic bound of 3−  , as demonstrated by the following example.
Example 3.5. Consider the dataset S of n agents with the following examples: one agent with P1 = t + 1, N1 = t , and
n − 1 additional agents each holding 2t + 1 negative examples. Thus P = t + 1;N = (n − 1)(2t + 1) but P ′ = 2t + 1; N ′ =
(n − 1)(2t + 1). The optimal classiﬁer makes |P | = t + 1 mistakes, thus r∗ = t+1m . On the other hand, the expected number
of mistakes made by the mechanism is
m · RI
(
WRD(S), S
)= p− · |P | + p+ · |N| = N ′
m
· (t + 1) + P
′
m
· ((n− 1)(2t + 1) + t)
= (n− 1)(2t + 1)
n(2t + 1) (t + 1) +
2t + 1
n(2t + 1) (2nt + n− t − 1)
= (n− 1)(t + 1)
n
+ 2nt + n− t − 1
n
= nt + n− t − 1+ 2nt + n− t − 1
n
= 3nt + 2n− 2t − 2
n
.
7 This procedure is equivalent to randomly selecting an agent with probability proportional to its weight, and using its preferred classiﬁer to classify the
entire dataset—hence Weighted Random Dictator.
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RI (WRD(S), S)
r∗
= 3nt + 2n− 2t − 2
n(t + 1)
t→∞→ 3− 2
n
. (9)
Thus, for every  > 0, there is a large-enough t such that the approximation ratio is worse than 3− 2n −  .
Note that in this example all agents control datasets of the same size (2t+1). A similar example can be crafted with two
weighted agents, by merging the datasets of agents 2, . . . ,n to a single, heavier, agent. This example will provide us with a
lower bound of 3− 2w1, where w1 is the weight of the lighter agent.
Crucially, an adjusted, less intuitive randomization can do the trick.
Mechanism 2 The Square Weighted Dictator Mechanism (SRD)
Compute P ′ and N ′ as in Mechanism 1.
Return c+ or c− with probability proportional to (P ′)2, (N ′)2, respectively.
Theorem 3.6.Mechanism 2 is a group-SP 2-approximation randomized mechanism.
There are, in fact, multiple ways to achieve a 2-approximation using different randomizations on N ′ and P ′ . In a previous
version of this paper we suggested one such alternative randomization [28]. A third procedure follows as a special case from
the CRD mechanism described in Section 4.1.
3.3. Binary decision in a learning theoretic setting
In this section we extend our simple setting to a more general machine learning framework. Our previous results will be
leveraged to obtain powerful learning theoretic results.
Instead of looking at a ﬁxed set of examples and selecting the concept that ﬁts them best, we now turn to look at
sampled datasets. That is, we assume that there is some ﬁxed and known distribution DX ∈ (X ) (where (A) is the set of
probability distributions over a set A), which represents the interest that agents have in different parts of the input space.
According to our shared input assumption, the distribution of interest is the same for all agents.
In addition, each agent i ∈ I now has a private function Yi : X → {+,−}, which assigns a label to every point in the
input space. Observe that Yi , along with the distribution DX , induces a (private) distribution Di over inputs and labels, i.e.,
Di ∈ (X × {+,−}). This distribution determines the type of agent i.
The new deﬁnition of the subjective risk naturally extends the previous setting by expressing the errors a concept makes
with respect to the distribution Di :
Ri(c) = E(x,y)∼Di
[
c(x) = y]= Ex∼DX [c(x) = Yi(x)]. (10)
The global risk is calculated similarly to how it was previously deﬁned, as the weighted average of the private risk, i.e.,
RI (c) =
∑
i∈I
wi · Ri(c). (11)
For ease of exposition, we will assume in this section that all agents have equal weight. Thus, RI (c) = 1n
∑
i∈I Ri(c). In
Section 4.3, when discussing the more general problem, we will not use this assumption.8
Similarly, we can no longer compare the outcome of our mechanism to r∗(S), as this notion of the optimal risk assumes
a ﬁxed dataset, whereas an instance of the learning-theoretic setting consists of a set of distributions. We therefore deﬁne
the minimal risk as
rmin = inf
c∈C RI (c). (12)
Although in the general case C might be an open set, in our simple two-function setting C is ﬁnite, and rmin =
min{RI (c−),RI (c+)}.
Note that we cannot directly evaluate the risk in this learning theoretic framework; we may only sample points from the
agents’ distributions and ask the agents to label them. We then try to minimize the real global risk, using the empirical risk
as a proxy.9 The empirical risk is the risk on the sampled dataset, as deﬁned in the previous section.
8 The results in this section can also be generalized to varying weights by sampling for each agent a number of points proportional to its weight, yet still
large enough.
9 This is similar to an oracle model, where we have no direct access to the distribution, but we can ask yes/no questions about it. The major difference
is that in our model the “oracle” may lie! (perhaps the Sphinx model would be a better name).
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data points as input is strategyproof. Indeed, even if there is only a single agent, which gives greater weight to negative
points (according to D1), it might be the case that, by miserable chance, the agent’s sampled dataset only contains positive
points. Thus there is some non-zero probability that the agent will have an incentive to “lie” by reporting negative labels.
We note that even allowing payments would not guarantee strategyproofness in our example, as it contains only one
agent. This fact may seem contradictory to the revelation principle (see, e.g., [32]), but not if we recall that truthful mech-
anisms are only guaranteed to exist under direct revelation. In our domain, direct revelation means that the agents must be
asked to explicitly select the classiﬁer they prefer. However in the learning-theoretic setting the agents only reveal their
preferences indirectly, by submitting their preferred labels on the sampled data points.
3.3.1. Three game-theoretic assumptions
While full strategyproofness is too much to ask for, we can still make assumptions on the behavior of agents that will
allow us to formally analyze the outcome of our mechanisms. We exploit this very simple setting to clarify the distinction
between three alternative game-theoretic assumptions on agents’ behavior.
The -truthfulness assumption The ﬁrst assumption is that agents will not lie unless their expected gain from this lie is at
least  . This assumption is stronger than the rationality assumption in the decision-making setting, where we demanded
this only for  = 0. In Section 4.3 we refer to this assumption as the “Truthful Approach”. This is the approach taken for
example by Dekel et al. [10].
The pure rationality assumption A second assumption is that agents will always play a dominant strategy, if one is available
to them. The existence of dominant strategies depends on the mechanism, as well as on the dataset, and we allow arbitrary
behavior when such a strategy does not exist. This assumption is also stronger than the standard rationality assumption
(which does not assume anything about agents’ behavior when truth-telling is suboptimal), but it is incomparable with
the ﬁrst assumption. In Section 4.3 we refer to this assumption as the “rational approach”. It is important to note that the
rational approach entails that agents must have complete knowledge of their own distribution. This implicit assumption is
not necessary under the truthful approach.
The weak truthfulness assumption The third assumption, which is also the weakest, requires that an agent is truthful if this
is a weakly dominant strategy, i.e., if it cannot gain by lying.
An agent that always obeys the ﬁrst, second or third assumption is called -truthful, purely rational, or weakly truthful,
respectively. Note that both -truthful agents (for any   0) and purely rational agents are always weakly truthful, which
means that the third assumption is indeed the weakest.
In this section we employ the third assumption as it supplies us with the strongest results. Thus the results in this section
are “stronger” in a way than the results of Dekel et al. [10] (regression) and the results in Section 4 (classiﬁcation).10
Remark 4. We offer a simple scenario that will highlight the substantial difference between the different assumptions.
Suppose we employ the pure rationality assumption, and consider the following simple mechanism: sample one point
from DX , and let all agents label this single point. If an agent labels the point positively, the agent is positive; otherwise it
is negative. Now apply either Mechanism 1 or Mechanism 2. This clearly gives us approximation upper bounds of 3 and 2
respectively, using only one sampled data point. In contrast, the -truthfulness assumption will not guarantee anything in
this case. This suggests that the difference between the assumptions is non-trivial. Compare also with the analysis of the
two ﬁrst approaches in Section 4.3.
Mechanism 3 The Binary Learning Mechanism (S˜RD)
for each agent i ∈ I do
Sample m′ =mi points i.i.d. from DX .
Denote i’s set of data points as Xi = {xi,1, . . . , xi,m′ }.
Ask agent i to label Xi .
Denote Si = {〈xi, j , Y i(xi, j)〉}m′j=1.
end for
Use Mechanism 2 on S = {S1, . . . , Sn}, return SRD(S).
10 In fact, a simple variant of the proofs in Section 4.3 could be directly applied to the binary decision problem (as it is a special case of shared inputs,
and has a bounded VC dimension), yielding an approximation ratio that is close to 2. However, this bound would only hold under either of the ﬁrst two
strategic assumptions.
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taken over both randomizations: the sampling of the data points, and the randomization performed by SRD. Formally (for
both private and global risk),
R(S˜RD) = EX∼(DX )m
[
R
(
SRD(S)
)]
, (13)
where the labels of X in S are set according to our strategic assumptions.
We presently establish a theorem that explicitly states the number of examples we need to sample in order to properly
estimate the real risk. We will get that, in expectation (taken over the randomness of the sampling procedure and Mecha-
nism 2’s randomization), Mechanism 3 yields close to a 2-approximation with relatively few examples, even in the face of
strategic behavior.
Theorem 3.7. Given sampled datasets, assume weak truthfulness. For any  > 0, there is m′ (polynomial in ln(n) and 1 ) such that by
sampling m′ points for each agent, it holds that
RI (S˜RD) 2rmin + .
Speciﬁcally, sampling m′ > 50 1
2
ln( 10n ) will suﬃce.
While the proof is quite technical, it can be sketched as follows. Mechanism 2 is SP with respect to the (already sampled)
dataset S . Thus if an agent’s sampled dataset faithfully represents its true distribution, and the agent is strongly inclined
towards c+ or c− , the agent still cannot beneﬁt by lying (by the weak truthfulness assumption). If an agent is almost
indifferent between c+ and c− , it might wish to lie—but crucially, such an agent contributes little to the global risk.
4. Classiﬁcation with shared inputs
We begin with an analysis of the decision-theoretic setting. As in Section 3, these results will later be applied to the
learning-theoretic setting.
In this section, we assume that all agents control the same set of data points. The size of this dataset is denoted by k.
The total number of labeled data points from all agents is thus m = n · k. However, as our mechanisms in this section use
only a single agent, k is effectively the size of the input being used.
4.1. Deterministic mechanisms
We start by examining an extremely simple deterministic mechanism. Recall that erm(S ′) is the concept c ∈ C that
minimizes the risk w.r.t. S ′ ⊆ S (see Eq. (4)). Our mechanism simply lets the heaviest agent dictate which concept is chosen.
Mechanism 4 The Heaviest Dictator Mechanism (HD)
h ← argmaxi∈I wi . // (Let h ∈ I be an agent with maximal weight)
return erm(Sh).
If more than one erm exists, return one of them arbitrarily. The mechanism is clearly SP: the heaviest dictator h has no
interest to lie, since its best concept is selected; all other agents are simply ignored, and therefore have no reason to lie
either. We have the following result.
Theorem 4.1. Let |I| = n. For every concept class C and any dataset S, Mechanism 4 is an SP (2n− 1)-approximation mechanism.
Recall the central negative result regarding deterministic mechanisms with non-restricted input.
Theorem 4.2 (Meir, Procaccia, and Rosenschein [29]). There exist concept classes for which any deterministic SP mechanism has an
approximation ratio of at least Ω(m), where m is the total size of the full dataset.
We therefore see that the restriction to shared inputs helps by removing the dependency on the size of the dataset, but
nevertheless an approximation ratio that increases linearly with the number of agents is not very appealing. However, it
turns out that using deterministic mechanisms we cannot do better with respect to every concept class. Indeed, a slight
variation of Theorem 4.2 gives us the following result.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose there are n agents with shared inputs. There exist concept classes for which any deterministic SP mechanism
has an approximation ratio of at least Ω(n), even if all the weights are equal.
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impossibility theorem [17,38].
Theorem 4.3 implies that Mechanism 4 is optimal, up to a constant, as a generic mechanism that applies to any concept
class. Of course, for speciﬁc concept classes one can do much better, as shown in Section 3. One could hope that imposing
further restrictions on the dataset, such as realizability, would enable the design of better SP mechanisms. However, recent
results show that the Ω(n) bound remains even if all datasets are realizable [13].
4.2. Randomized mechanisms
In order to break the lower bound given by Theorem 4.3, we employ a simple randomization. We will see that this
randomization yields a constant approximation ratio with respect to any concept class (under our assumption of shared inputs,
of course). Moreover, if the agents have uniform weights, then this mechanism cannot be further improved.
Mechanism 5 The Weighted Random Dictator (WRD) mechanism
select agent i with probability wi .
return erm(Si).
Consider Mechanism 5, which is clearly SP. The following theorem bounds its approximation ratio for different cases.
Theorem 4.4. For every concept class C and for any dataset S, Mechanism 5 is an SP (3− 2wmin)-approximation mechanism, where
wmin =mini∈I wi . Moreover, if S is individually realizable, then (2− 2wmin)-approximation is guaranteed.
When all agents have the same weight, we have that wmin = 1n . We therefore have the following corollary which follows
directly from Theorem 4.4.
Corollary 4.5. Let |I| = n, and assume all agents have equal weights. For every concept class C and for any dataset S, Mechanism 5 is
an SP (3− 2n )-approximation mechanism (2− 2n when S is individually realizable).
The last corollary also follows as a special case from results we will see in Section 4.2.2.
It is possible to show that the analysis of Mechanism 5 is tight. Indeed, consider the outcome of the mechanism for the
concept class {c−, c+}. In this case, the mechanism is essentially equivalent to the naive randomized mechanism presented
in Section 3.2, and yields the same outcome. Therefore, Example 3.5 gives a tight lower bound on the approximation ratio
of the mechanism, matching the upper bound given in Theorems 4.4 and 4.5. A similar example can be easily constructed
for every concept class of size at least two.
4.2.1. Is theWRDmechanism optimal?
It is natural to ask whether better (randomized) SP mechanisms exist. For speciﬁc concept classes, the answer to this
question is positive, as demonstrated by Theorem 3.6. For general concept classes, the following lower bound is known.
Theorem 4.6 (Meir, Almagor, Michaely and Rosenschein [27]). Suppose there are n agents with shared inputs. There exist concept
classes for which any randomized SP mechanism has an approximation ratio of at least 3− 2n , even if all the weights are equal.
Theorem 4.6 shows that when weights are uniform, the WRD mechanism (i.e., selecting a dictator uniformly at random)
is in fact optimal. That is, no SP mechanism can do better. However, the mechanism is suboptimal for weighted datasets, as
it only guarantees a 3 approximation in this case.
We next turn to close this gap, presenting new mechanisms that beat the WRD mechanism on weighted datasets,
matching the lower bound given in Theorem 4.6.
4.2.2. Improving the upper bound for weighted agents
Theorem 4.6 in fact tells us that we must pick a dictator at random to have an SP mechanism. However we are still free
to deﬁne the probabilities of selecting different agents, and we may take agents’ weights into account. The WRD mechanism
is an example of such a randomization, but we can design others.
Recall that in the two-function scenario, we performed an optimal randomization by using the SRD mechanism. As a
ﬁrst attempt to improve the upper bound, we translate the SRD mechanism to the current setting.11 That is, the mech-
anism would select every dictator i ∈ I with probability proportional to w2i . Unfortunately, while SRD does attain some
improvement over the WRD mechanism, it is still suboptimal, even for n = 3.
11 We slightly abuse notation here and use the name SRD, although it is no longer equivalent to Mechanism 2.
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RI
(
SRD(S), S
)
> 2.4 · r∗ >
(
3− 2
n
)
r∗.
A similar counterexample exists for individually realizable datasets, where the approximation ratio of SRD is above 1.39
(i.e., strictly above 2− 2n for n = 3). We therefore must take a somewhat different approach in the selection of the dictator.
Consider the mechanisms CRD and RRD, where the latter is a small variation of the former.
Mechanism 6 The Convex-weight Random Dictator Mechanism (CRD)
for each i ∈ I , set p′i = wi2−2wi .
compute αw = 1∑
i∈I p′i
.
select agent i with probability pi = αwp′i .
return erm(Si).
Mechanism 7 The Realizable-weight Random Dictator Mechanism (RRD)
h ← argmaxi∈I wi .
if wh  12 then
return erm(Sh).
end if
for each i ∈ I , set p′i = wi1−2wi .
compute βw = 1∑
i∈I p′i
.
select agent i with probability pi = βwp′i .
return erm(Si).
The CRD and RRD mechanisms are clearly SP, as the probabilities are unaffected by the reported labels.
Theorem 4.8. The following hold for Mechanism 6:
• αw  2− 2n .
• CRD has an approximation ratio of 1+ αw , i.e., at most 3− 2n .
• if S is individually realizable, then the approximation ratio is αw2 + 1, i.e., at most 2− 1n .
By Theorem 4.6, no SP mechanism can do better on a general dataset in the worst case, thus CRD is optimal. However,
if the dataset is known to be individually realizable, CRD is suboptimal, and RRD is strictly better (in the worst case).
Theorem 4.9. The following hold for Mechanism 7:
• βw  1− 2n .• RRD has an approximation ratio of at most 4, and at least 3 (in the worst case).
• if S is individually realizable, then the approximation ratio is 1+ βw , i.e., at most 2− 2n .
Observe that for two agents the RRD simply selects the heavier dictator. Thus if the dataset is not realizable, the approx-
imation ratio can be as high as 3, which accounts for the lower bound in the non-realizable case.
The CRD mechanism matches the lower bounds for any set of weighted agents, thereby showing that the uniform weight
case is, in fact, the hardest. The situation with the RRD mechanism is similar—no randomization of dictators can do better.
However, it is still an open question whether there are better, more sophisticated, randomized mechanisms for the realizable
case. The natural conjecture would be that there are none, as Dokow et al. proved for deterministic mechanisms [13].
Note that when weights are uniform, then the CRD, RRD, SRD and WRD mechanisms all coincide.12 Thus Theorem 4.5
also follows as a special case from Theorems 4.8, 4.9.
Curiously, RRD is better than CRD when the dataset in known to be realizable, whereas in the general case the converse
is true. Therefore, a different mechanism should be used, depending on our assumptions on the dataset. However, the
mechanism must be decided on a-priori—we cannot select between CRD and RRD after observing the labels, as this would
not be strategyproof!
12 There is a tiny exception here: when n = 2, w1 = w2 = 12 , then RRD returns an arbitrary dictator, rather than random. However in this case any
outcome is a 1-approximation.
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Suppose that C = {+,−}. We can join together all positive agents, and all negative agents, and construct an instance
with two meta-agents, whose weights are proportional to P ′,N ′ (as deﬁned in Section 3.1). The RRD mechanism then
simply selects the heavier meta-agent (equivalently to the PM mechanism), and thus guarantees an approximation ratio
of 3. The CRD mechanism, applied to this setting, guarantees an approximation ratio of 3 − 2n = 3 − 22 = 2. It therefore
supplies us with an alternative 2-approximation SP mechanism for the two-function setting.
4.3. The learning-theoretic setting
In this section we leverage the upper bounds which were attained in the decision-theoretic setting to obtain results in
a machine-learning framework. That is, we present a learning mechanism that guarantees a constant approximation of the
optimal risk in expectation, even in the face of strategic behavior.
We use the notations and deﬁnitions introduced in Section 3.3, where the preferences of each agent are represented by
a function Yi :X → {+,−}.13 Reinterpreting our shared input assumption in the learning-theoretic setting, we assume that
all agents have the same probability distribution DX over X , which reﬂects the relative importance that the agents attribute
to different input points; the distribution DX is common knowledge.
The private risk of a classiﬁer c ∈ C is computed according to Eq. (10):
Ri(c) = Ex∼DX
[
c(x) = Yi(x)
]
.
That is, according to the expected number of errors that c makes w.r.t. the distribution DX . As for the global risk, it is
computed according to Eq. (11), i.e.
RI (c) =
∑
i∈I
wiRi(c).
The goal of our mechanisms is to ﬁnd classiﬁers with low risk. We therefore compare them to the best risk that is
attainable by concepts in C , and thus rmin = infc∈C RI (c). Eq. (12) is a special case of this deﬁnition for C = {c−, c+}.
Our goal is, once again, to design mechanisms with risk close to optimal. However, constructing an SP mechanism
that learns from sampled data is nearly impossible (as explained in Remark 3). Hence, we weaken the strategyproofness
requirement, and analyze the performance of our mechanisms under each of the ﬁrst two strategic assumptions described
in Section 3.3: the -truthfulness assumption, which states that agents do not lie unless they gain at least ; and the pure
rationality assumption, under which agents always play a weakly dominant strategy if one exists.
4.3.1. The -truthfulness assumption
An -strategyproof mechanism is one where agents cannot gain more than  by lying. We show below that, similarly to
Dekel et al. [10], the results of Section 4.2 can be employed to obtain a mechanism that is “usually” -strategyproof. We
focus on the following mechanism.
Mechanism 8 The Generic Learning Mechanism (C˜RD)
Sample k data points i.i.d. from DX (denote the sampled points by X ).
for each agent i ∈ I do
Ask agent i to label Xi .
Denote Si = {〈x j , Y i(x j)〉}kj=1.
end for
Use Mechanism 5 on S = {S1, . . . , Sn}, return CRD(S).
We denote by RI (C˜RD) the expected risk of Mechanism 8, where the expectation is taken over the randomness of the
sampling and the randomness of Mechanism 5, just as in Eq. (13) in the two-function setting:
R(C˜RD) = EX∼(DX )k
[
R
(
CRD(S)
)]
,
where the labels of X in S are set according to our varying strategic assumptions.
We wish to formulate a theorem that asserts that, given enough samples, the expected risk of Mechanism 8 is relatively
small under the -truthfulness assumption. The exact number of samples needed depends on the combinatorial richness
of the function class; this is usually measured using some notion of class complexity, such as the VC dimension (see, e.g.,
[21]). For instance, the VC dimension of the class of linear separators over Rd is d + 1. We do not dwell on this point too
much, and instead assume that the dimension is bounded.
13 As with the theorems in Section 4.1, our results in this section will follow as a special case from the more general model, where agents have distribu-
tions over the labels.
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(polynomial in 1 and ln(n)) s.t. if at least k data points are sampled, then the expected risk of Mechanism 8 is at most (3− 2n ) · rmin + .
The proof sketch is as follows:
(a) There is a high probability that the random sample is “good”, i.e., close to the actual interest of the agents.
(b) Whenever the sample is good for some agent, this agent will report truthfully (under the -truthfulness assumption).
(c) When the sample is good for all agents, the risk of Mechanism 8 is close to the risk of Mechanism 5, and thus we have
almost a (3− 2n )-approximation.
(d) Otherwise the risk can be high, but this has a small effect on the total expected risk, as it occurs with low probability.
We prove Theorem 4.10 along these lines in Appendix B.2, and supply an exact upper bound on the number of samples
required for the theorem to hold.
4.3.2. The pure rationality assumption
Recall that under the pure rationality assumption, an agent will always use a dominant strategy, when one exists. We
once again consider the performance of Mechanism 8. Note that since our mechanism uses a dictator, each agent i has a
weakly dominant strategy. In order to see that, observe that there is some classiﬁer cˆi that minimizes the risk w.r.t. the
whole distribution Di .14 The dominant strategy of agent i is to label the sampled dataset X according to cˆi . Note that this
does not mean that i is being truthful, as it is possible that cˆi(x) = Yi(x) (see Remark 3).
Theorem 4.11. Assume all agents are purely rational, and let C be any concept class with a bounded dimension. For any  > 0, there is
k (polynomial only in 1 ) s.t. if at least k data points are sampled, then the expected risk of Mechanism 8 is at most (3− 2n ) · rmin +  .
Interestingly, the alternative assumption improved the sample complexity: the number of required samples no longer
depends on n, only on 1 . In a somewhat counter-intuitive way, the rationality assumption provides us with better bounds
without using the notion of truthfulness at all. This can be explained by the fact that a rational (i.e., self-interested) labeling
of the dataset is a better proxy to an agent’s real type than a truthful labeling. Indeed, this strange claim is true since the
sampling process might produce a set of points X that represents the agent’s distribution in an inaccurate way.15
5. Discussion
We ﬁrst review our results in the decision making setting, then in the learning theoretic setting, and ﬁnally present some
directions for future research.
5.1. Decision making setting
We started by studying the simple case where there are only two possible decisions. In this setting there is an almost
trivial mechanism that is group strategyproof, and guarantees a 3-approximation ratio. While there are no better determinis-
tic mechanisms, we showed how a speciﬁc randomization can be used to achieve a 2-approximation ratio, while maintaining
the group-SP property.
For the more general case, we showed that a simple randomization of the dictator (the WRD mechanism) achieves
the best possible approximation ratio when agents have uniform weights, but falls short in the weighted case. We then
presented a new mechanism that closes this gap and obtains optimal approximation results in the general case (CRD).
In the weighted realizable case, we presented a mechanism that matches the best known results with uniform weights.
However it is still an open question whether this bound is tight, as no non-trivial lower bounds are known.
We showed that these approximation results stand in sharp contrast to the deterministic case, where no deterministic
mechanism can guarantee a constant approximation ratio. The trivial selection of the heaviest agent as a dictator is the best
deterministic SP mechanism at hand. Results also highlight the power of the shared inputs assumption, as they allow us to
break the lower bounds that hold in the general case [29].
All these results (summarized in Tables 1 and 2) may help decision makers—both human and automated—in reaching a
decision that approximately maximizes social welfare, when data might be biased by conﬂicting interests.
5.1.1. Implications for facility location
As we hinted in the introduction, our classiﬁcation model can be seen as facility location in metric spaces, where the
particular space that we use is the binary cube. In fact, the 2− 2n bound in Theorem 4.5 follows directly from a folk result in
14 There is a ﬁne issue here regarding the ﬁniteness of the concept class, that we deal with in the proof.
15 As we explained in Remark 3, the revelation principle does not apply here, since the agents do not report their full preferences.
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Summary of results (deterministic mechanisms). The corresponding theorem for each result appears in parentheses.
All classes (shared inputs) Binary decision
General datasets Realizable datasets
HD O (n) (Th. 4.1) ⇒ O (n) ⇒ O (n)
PM – – 3 (Th. 3.2)
Lower bound Ω(n) (Th. 4.3) Ω(n) [13] 3 (Th. 3.3)
Table 2
Summary of results (randomized mechanisms). We conjecture that the upper bound for realizable datasets is tight, but this remains an open question.
All classes (shared inputs) Binary decision
General datasets Realizable datasets
WRD 3 (Th. 4.4) 2 (Th. 4.4) ⇒ 3
SRD > 2.4 (Prop. 4.7) > 1.39 2 (Th. 3.6)
CRD 3− 2n (Th. 4.8) 2− 1n (Th. 4.8) 2
RRD  3 (Th. 4.9) 2− 2n (Th. 4.9) 3
Best upper bound 3− 2n (CRD) 2− 2n (RRD) 2 (SRD, CRD)
Lower bound 3− 2n (Th. 4.6 [27]) ? 2 (Th. 3.4)
facility location, and has been employed, for example, by Alon et al. [2]. We will next describe our results in the decision-
theoretic setting in the wider context of metric spaces, thereby extending and generalizing the mentioned folk theorem.
Let 〈F ,d〉 be a metric space.16 Let F = { f1, . . . , fn} be a ﬁnite set of points in F , where each point f i has an attached
weight wi reﬂecting its importance. Deﬁne d( f , F ) as the (weighted) average distance from f to F , and let f ∗ ∈F be the
point that minimizes this distance, i.e.,
f ∗ = argmin
f ∈F
d( f , F ) = argmin
f ∈F
∑
in
wid( f , f i).
We are interested in selecting one of the points in F , that will be as close as possible to all other points. The restriction
is that this selection must be “blind”. That is, we must select without knowing the actual distances. All we know are the
weights of the n points. Clearly, if weights are uniform, one can do no better than simply picking a random point in F . The
following inequality, which is a folk theorem, bounds the expected distance achieved in this process.
1
n
∑
in
d( f i, F )
(
2− 2
n
)
d
(
f ∗, F
)
. (14)
As we informally explained before, the upper bounds on the approximation ratio of the WRD mechanism (e.g., the
realizable part of Theorem 4.5) can be derived from Eq. (14) by deﬁning a metric over classiﬁers, reﬂecting the fraction
of the data space on which they disagree. In the uniform-weight, realizable case, the WRD mechanism picks an agent at
random, and thus its risk is exactly the average distance between each agent’s optimal classiﬁer and the other agents. The
formal details appear in Appendix B, where we also supply an analog for the non-realizable case, and extend our bounds to
weighted agents.
Moreover, the full proofs show that all mechanisms of Section 4 attain the speciﬁed approximation ratios in a more
general model, where the private labels are non-deterministic, and datasets are given in the form of a (private) distribution
over X × {+,−}.17 The theorems in Section 4, under the standard model we presented (with deterministic labels), follow
as a special case.
5.1.2. Implications for partition and judgment aggregation
Given a subset X of Rd (and in particular an interval), partitions of X just form another metric space. Informally, the
distance between two partitions is exactly the volume they disagree on. The set of all partitions that are allowed constitutes
the concept class C .
A similar approach to the Judgment aggregation problem requires some additional assumptions, since issues on the
agenda cannot always be directly compared and quantiﬁed. We will clarify this using the following simple example (the
Doctrinal paradox, see e.g. [14]): The agenda contains the three logical expressions X = (a,b,a∧ b). Legal assignments are
those that are also logically consistent (e.g., (1,1,1) is legal, but (1,1,0) is not). We can therefore naturally deﬁne C as the
16 It is in fact suﬃcient to assume that d is a pseudo-metric, i.e., it is possible that d( f , f ′) = 0 for f = f ′ .
17 The datasets in Section 3 can be viewed as a single data point with non-deterministic labels. The probabilities of a positive/negative label for agent i
are proportional to Pi and Ni , respectively.
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assignment. Consistency of the judges’ opinions coincides with the requirement that S is individually realizable. The subtle
issue is that a-priori, there is no reason to say that, for example, (1,1,0) is closer to (1,1,1) than to (0,0,0). However
if we assign a ﬁxed weight to every issue on the agenda (that all judges can agree on) then we have a natural metric,
and we are back at the “shared input” setting of Section 4. Our suggested mechanisms can therefore be used to randomize
a legal assignment that is close—on average—to the opinions of the judges. It is important to note however that if the
judges disagree on the importance of certain issues, then approximation is not well-deﬁned, and even strategyproofness is
no longer guaranteed.
Dokow and Holzman [14] characterized those agendas for which (deterministic) non-dictatorial aggregation rules exist.18
Our randomizations guarantee a constant bound on the social welfare under any agenda, but it is likely that under some
families of agendas (such as those characterized by Dokow and Holzman), an even better outcome can be guaranteed.
We should mention in this context a recent paper by Nehama [31], which studies approximate judgment aggregation
rules from a different angle, without considering incentives or welfare at all. Rather, the paper characterizes rules whose
properties (e.g., consistency) only approximately hold. We hope to explore the applicability of similar relaxations to other
domains in our future work.
5.2. Learning-theoretic setting
In all cases where a constant upper bound on the approximation ratio was available, we showed how to use the SP
decision mechanism to implement learning mechanisms with a bounded expected risk. More precisely, our mechanisms
sample a ﬁnite number of data points from a given distribution, which are thereafter labeled by self-interested agents. The
expected risk of the mechanism (where expectation is taken over both sampling procedure and internal randomization) is
compared to the expected risk (over the given distribution) of the best classiﬁer in the concept class. This allows us to
achieve an approximation ratio that is arbitrarily close to the approximation guaranteed in the decision theoretic setting:
2 when there are only two classiﬁers, and 3 − 2n when there are more (provided that all agents sample from the same
distribution). When the optimal risk itself is high (say, above 5–10%) then such results are not very useful. With low
optimal risk, a constant approximation ratio of 2 or 3 is quite good, especially since it applies across all concept classes and
all distributions.
We made a distinction between alternative game-theoretic assumptions on agents’ behavior, showing how the different
assumptions affect the mechanism and the number of required samples.
Our results in the learning theoretic setting contribute to the design of algorithms that can function well in non-
cooperative environments. We also promote understanding of the underlying assumptions on agents’ behavior in such
environments, and how these may affect the learning process.
5.3. Future work
Future research may provide answers to some of the questions we left open, and expand this young hybrid ﬁeld in new
directions. More eﬃcient SP mechanisms may be crafted to handle speciﬁc concept classes. Further extensions of the SP
classiﬁcation model we presented may be considered: formalizations other than the PAC-like one we suggested; different
loss functions; alternative game-theoretic assumptions as well as restrictions on the structure of the dataset. It is also
possible to alter the model by allowing different types of strategic behavior, such as misreporting the location of the data
points rather than their labels.
All of these directions may reveal new parts of the overall picture and promote a better understanding of the conditions
under which SP learning can take place effectively. This, in turn, might supply us with new insights regarding our results
and regarding their relationship to other areas.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Section 3
Theorem 3.4. Let  > 0. There is no (2− )-approximation strategyproof randomized mechanism.
Proof. We will use the same datasets used in the proof of Theorem 3.3, and illustrated in Fig. 3. Let M be an SP randomized
mechanism, and denote by pM(c | S) its probability of outputting c given S .
We ﬁrst show that the mechanism chooses the positive hypothesis with the same probability in all three datasets.
18 Dokow and Holzman [14] did not require strategyproofness, but different properties that are closely related.
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Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.3, the agents can make one dataset look like another dataset. If pM(c+ | S I ) = pM(c+ |
SII) then agent 2 will report its labels in a way that guarantees a higher probability of c− . Similarly, pM(c+ | SII) = pM(c+ |
SIII) implies that agent 1 can increase the probability of c+ by lying. 
Denote
p+ = pM
(
c+
∣∣ S I)= pM(c+ ∣∣ SII)= pM(c+ ∣∣ SIII),
and
p− = pM
(
c−
∣∣ S I)= pM(c− ∣∣ SII)= pM(c− ∣∣ SIII).
Without loss of generality p+  12  p− . Then:
RI
(
M
(
SIII
)
, SIII
)= p+RI(c+, SIII)+ p−RI(c−, SIII)
= p+ · 3t + 1
4t + 2 + p− ·
t + 1
4t + 2 
1
2
· 3t + 1
4t + 2 +
1
2
· t + 1
4t + 2 =
1
2
,
whereas
r∗ = RI
(
c−, SIII
)= t + 1
4t + 2 .
For t > 1 it holds that
RI (M(SIII), SIII)
r∗
= 4t + 2
2(t + 1) = 2−
1
t + 1 > 2− .
As before, if p− > p+ , a symmetric argument shows that RI (M(S I ), S I ) > (2 − )r∗ . Therefore no SP mechanism can
achieve a (2− )-approximation, even through randomization. 
Theorem 3.6.Mechanism 2 is a group strategyproof 2-approximation randomized mechanism.
Proof. Similarly to Mechanism 1, Mechanism 2 is clearly group SP, since declaring a false label may only increase the
probability of obtaining a classiﬁer that labels correctly less than half of the agent’s examples, thus increasing the subjective
expected risk.
Assume without loss of generality that N  P , i.e., that the negative classiﬁer c− is better. Denote by w = N ′m the total
weight of all agents that support c− .
Lemma A.2. 1− r∗  1+w1−w r∗ .
Proof. The largest possible number of negative examples is achieved when all the negative agents control only negative
examples, and all the positive agents control only a slight majority of positive labels. Formally, N  N ′ + P ′2 , and thus:
1− r∗ = RI (c+) = N
m
 N
′
m
+ P
′
2m
= w + 1− w
2
= 1+ w
2
.
It must follow that r∗ = 1− (1− r∗) 1−w2 . By dividing the two inequalities, 1−r
∗
r∗ 
1+w
1−w ; thus the lemma is proved. 
RI
(
SRD(S), S
)= w2RI (c−, S) + (1− w)2RI (c+, S)
w2 + (1− w)2
= w
2r∗ + (1− w)2(1− r∗)
w2 + (1− w)2 
w2r∗ + (1− w)2 1+w1−w r∗
w2 + (1− w)2 (from Lemma A.2)
= w
2r∗ + (1− w)(1+ w)r∗
w2 + (1− w)2 =
1
2w2 − 2w + 1 r
∗
 1
1/2
r∗ = 2r∗,
where the last inequality holds since 2w2 − 2w + 1 has a minimum in w = 12 . 
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sampling m′ points for each agent, it holds that
RI (S˜RD) 2rmin + .
Speciﬁcally, sampling m′ > 50 1
2
ln( 10n ) will suﬃce.
Proof. In this proof we will differentiate the real risk, as deﬁned for the learning-theoretic setting, from the empirical risk
on a given sample, as deﬁned in the simple setting. The empirical risk will be denoted by
RˆI (c, S) = 1
m
∑
〈x,y〉∈S

c(x) = y.
Also, to simplify notation we replace S˜RD with just M throughout the proof. Note that M can equally stand for any other
group strategyproof 2-approximation mechanism (including CRD, and the mechanism presented in [28]).
Without loss of generality we assume that r∗ = RI (c−) < RI (c+). Notice that if r∗ = RI (c∗) = RI (c−) > 12 − 3 then any
concept our mechanism returns will trivially attain a risk of at most 12 + 3  r∗ + 6 . Therefore, we can assume for the
rest of this proof that
RI (c−) + 3  1
2
 RI (c+) − 3. (15)
Let us introduce some new notations and deﬁnitions. Denote the data set with the real labels by Si = {〈xi, j, Yi(xi, j)〉} jm′ ;
S = {S1, . . . , Sn}. Note that the mechanism has no direct access to S , but only to the reported labels as they appear in S .
Deﬁne G as the event “the empirical and real risk differ by at most  for all agents”; formally:
∀c ∈ {c+, c−}, ∀i ∈ I,
∣∣Rˆi(c, Si) − Ri(c)∣∣< . (16)
Lemma A.3. Let δ > 0. If m′ > 1
22
ln( 2n
δ
), then with probability of at least 1− δ, G occurs.
Proof. Fix i ∈ I . Consider the event Yi(x) = +, and its indicator random variable [[Yi(x) = +]]. We can rewrite the empirical
and real risk as the sum and the expectation of this variable:
Ri(c−) = Ex∼DX
[
Yi(x) = +
]= E(x,y)∼Di [[[y = +]]],
Rˆi(c−, Si) = 1
m′
∑
(x,y)∈Si

Yi(x) = +
= 1
m′
∑
(x,y)∈Si
[[y = +]].
Since Si is sampled i.i.d. from Di , the empirical risk is the sum of independent Bernoulli random variables with expectation
Ri(c−). We derive from the Chernoff bound that for any data set of size |Si | =m′:
Pr
[∣∣Rˆi(c−, Si) − Ri(c−)∣∣> ]< 2e−22m′ .
Taking m′ > 1
22
ln( 2n
δ
), we get:
Pr[¬G] = Pr[∃i ∈ I, ∣∣Rˆi(c−, Si) − Ri(c−)∣∣> ]

∑
i∈I
Pr
[∣∣Rˆi(c−, Si) − Ri(c−)∣∣> ] |I|2e−22m′ < n δ
n
= δ,
where the ﬁrst inequality is due to the union bound. 
Note that since∣∣Rˆi(c−, Si) − Ri(c−)∣∣= ∣∣Rˆi(c+, Si) − Ri(c+)∣∣,
it is enough to show the above for c− .
If G occurs, then from (16) and the triangle inequality it holds that for all c ∈ {c+, c−} and i ∈ I ,∣∣RI (c) − RˆI (c, S)∣∣∑
i∈I
1
n
∣∣Ri(c) − Rˆi(c, S)∣∣ . (17)
Using (17) we could have bounded the risk of M(S), but unfortunately this would not do as the mechanism may only
access S and not S . In order to bound RI (M(S)), we need to know, or estimate, how the agents label their examples. To
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following two properties: no agent has motivation to lie (thus we can assess the result of running M on S˜), and S˜, S are
very similar.
We now divide I into two types of agents: I ′ = {i ∈ I: |Ri(c−)− 12 | < }, and I ′′ = I \ I ′ . For each agent i ∈ I , we denote by
Pi,Ni the number of positive/negative examples the agent controls in Si . Note that Pi =m′Rˆi(c−, Si). Since RI (c−) < RI (c+)
we may assume without loss of generality that all agents i ∈ I ′ prefer c+ (otherwise lying only lowers the expected risk of
our mechanism). Agents in I ′′ , on the other hand, cannot beneﬁt by lying, since Si must reﬂect i’s truthful preferences, and
Mechanism 2 (which is used by Mechanism 3 in step 3) is SP.
For each agent i deﬁne a new set of examples S˜ i as follows:
• If i ∈ I ′′ , S˜ i = Si .
• If i ∈ I ′ , deﬁne P˜ i = Pi + m′ and let S˜ i contain P˜ i positive examples and m′ − P˜ i negative ones.
Lemma A.4. If G occurs, then for all agents in I
N˜i  P˜ i ⇐⇒ Ri(c−) Ri(c+).
Proof. If i ∈ I ′′ then w.l.o.g. Ri(c−) Ri(c+) − 2 , thus from (16)
P˜ i = Pi =m′Rˆi(c−, Si)m′
(
Ri(c−) + 
)
m′
(
Ri(c+) − 
)
m′Rˆi(c+, Si) = Ni = N˜i .
If i ∈ I ′ then according to our assumption
Ri(c+) Ri(c−) Ri(c+) + 2.
Moreover, by the deﬁnition of P˜ i ,
P˜ i  Pi +m′, N˜i  Ni −m′.
Thus
P˜ i  Pi +m′ =m′Rˆi(c−, Si) +m′ m′Ri(c−)m′Ri(c+)m′
(
Rˆi(c+, Si) − 
)
 Ni −m′  N˜i . 
Lemma A.4 implies that, if G occurs, agents cannot do better than report S˜ under Mechanism 3, since S˜ i reﬂects the real
preferences of agent i. Now, if agent i reports truthfully, then P i = Pi . If i decides to lie, it may report more positive labels,
but cannot gain from reporting more than P˜ i such labels, and, crucially, the mechanism’s outcome will not change in this
case. The immediate result is that we can assume:
P  P =
∑
i∈I
1
n
P i 
∑
i∈I
1
n
P˜ i = P˜ ,
and, since the expected risk of M only increases with the number of positive examples (the probability of Mechanism 3
choosing the positive classiﬁer increases),
RI
(
M(S)
)
 RI
(
M(S)
)
 RI
(
M( S˜)
)
. (18)
We can now concentrate on bounding the empirical risk on S˜ .
Lemma A.5. If G occurs,
∀c ∈ {c+, c−},
∣∣RI (c) − RˆI (c, S˜)∣∣ 3. (19)
As in Lemma A.3, it will suﬃce to show this only for c− .
Proof. From (16), for m′ > 1 ,
RˆI (c−, S˜) = P˜ i
m′
= Pi + m
′
m′
 Pi +m
′ + 1
m′
 Pi
′
+ 2 = RˆI (c−, S) + 2  RI (c−) +  + 2 = RI (c−) + 3. m
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RˆI (c−, S˜) RI (c−) + 3  RI (c+) − 3  RˆI (c+, S˜). (20)
So c− is also empirically the best concept for S˜; Mechanism 2 guarantees:
RˆI
(
M( S˜), S˜
)
 2RˆI (c−, S˜). (21)
Furthermore, since the risk of Mechanism 3 is a convex combination of the risk of c+, c− , we get from (19),
RI
(
M( S˜)
)
 RˆI
(
M( S˜), S˜
)+ 3. (22)
Finally, by using (18), (22), (21) and (20) in this order, we get that if G occurs:
RI
(
M(S)
)
 RI
(
M( S˜)
)
 RˆI
(
M( S˜), S˜
)+ 3  2RˆI (c−, S˜) + 3
 2
(
RI (c−) + 3
)+ 3 = 2r∗ + 9.
If G does not occur, the risk cannot exceed 1. Thus by applying Lemma A.3 with δ =  = ′10 we ﬁnd that for m′ >
50 1
′2 ln(
10n
′ ):
RI (S˜RD) Pr[G]
(
2r∗ + 9)+ Pr[¬G]1 2r∗ + 9 +   2r∗ + ′,
as required. 
Appendix B. Proofs of Section 4
B.1. Proofs of upper bounds under shared inputs (Sections 4.1, 4.2)
We formulate and prove our results in a somewhat more general model, in which the preferences of each agent are
encoded by a distribution, rather than a deterministic function. The new model extends the one presented in Section 4
with two components: (a) some data points may receive more attention than others; (b) the preferences of each agent can
reﬂect uncertainty, or indeterminism, regarding the label of a speciﬁc data point. The theorems in Section 4 follow easily as
a special case. In addition, the use of distributions makes the proofs in the generalization section (Section 4.3) easier and
more natural.
For that purpose we replace the proﬁle of ﬁnite datasets S = 〈S1, . . . , Sn〉 with a proﬁle of distributions F = 〈F1, . . . , Fn〉
over X × {−,+}. The marginal of all distributions over X is the same. We denote this marginal by FX , and take it as a
measure of the interest that the agents have in different parts of the input space. Let H be the set of all deterministic
functions h :X → {−,+}. In particular, C ⊆H.
We adjust the deﬁnition of the private and global risk to handle distributions.
The private risk of h ∈H to agent i w.r.t. the proﬁle F is thus deﬁned as
Ri(h, F ) = E〈x,y〉∼Fi
[
h(x) = y].
As usual, the global risk is deﬁned as
RI (h, F ) =
∑
i∈I
wiRi(h, F ).
As with discrete datasets, Fi is said to be realizable w.r.t. a concept class C ⊆ H if there is a concept c ∈ C such that
Ri(c, Fi) = 0.
Every distribution p on X × {−,+} induces a non-deterministic function f p from X to labels. Formally, Pr( f p(x) =
+|x) = E〈x,y〉∼p[[[y = +]]|x], and for convenience we denote this probability by f p(x) ∈ [0,1]. Similarly,
f p(x) = 1− f p(x) = Pr
(
f p(x) = −|x
)= E〈x,y〉∼p[[[y = −]] | x].
We denote by F the set of all such non-deterministic functions. Note that H⊂F , and thus every concept class C is also
a subset of F .
A special case is when p = Fi , in which case f i ≡ f p conveys the preferences of agent i. We assume that agents’ prefer-
ences are independent; thus for every two agents i = j, for every x ∈X and every y, y′ ∈ {−,+},
Pr
(
f i(x) = y, f j(x) = y′
∣∣ x)= Pr( f i(x) = y ∣∣ x)Pr( f j(x) = y′ ∣∣ x). (23)
Deﬁnition B.1. We deﬁne the distance between two classiﬁers (w.r.t. a ﬁxed distribution F X ∈ (X )), as the part of space
they label differently. Formally:
d
(
f , f ′
)= dF X ( f , f ′)= Ex∼F X [Pr( f (x) = f ′(x) ∣∣ x)]. (24)
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∀c ∈ C, ∀ j ∈ I, d( f j, c) = R j(c, F ). (25)
The proof of Eq. (25) is as follows.
R j(c, F ) ≡ E〈x,y〉∼F j
[
c(x) = y]= Ex∼F X
[ ∑
y∈{−,+}
Pr
y∼F j
(y | x)c(x) = y
]
= EF X
[
f j(x)

c(x) = −+ f j(x)

c(x) = +]
= EF X
[
Pr
(
f j(x) = −
∣∣ x)c(x) = −+ Pr( f j(x) = + ∣∣ x)c(x) = +]
= EF X
[
Pr
(
f j(x) = −, c(x) = +
∣∣ x)+ Pr( f j(x) = +, c(x) = − ∣∣ x)]
= EF X
[
Pr
(
f j(x) = c(x)
∣∣ x)]= d(c, f j) (from (24)).
Recall that ci = argminc∈C Ri(c, F ) and c∗ = argminc∈C RI (c, F ).
As a special case of Eq. (25), we get that
∀i, j (d(ci, f j) = R j(ci, F )), (26)
∀i ∈ I
(
ci = argmin
c∈C
d(c, f i)
)
. (27)
The following lemma can be seen as a formalization of the statement that our decision-making setting is equivalent to
facility location in some metric space (the binary cube).
Lemma B.2. d is reﬂexive, non-negative, symmetric and satisﬁes the triangle inequality.
Proof. Non-negativity and symmetry are trivial.
d( f , f ) = Ex∼F X [Pr( f (x) = f (x) | x)] = Ex∼F X [0] = 0, thus it is reﬂexive as well. We prove the triangle inequality. Let
f , f ′, f ′′ ∈F . Note that disagreement of f and f ′′ requires that at least one of them disagrees with f ′; thus for all x ∈X
Pr
(
f (x) = f ′′(x) ∣∣ x)= Pr( f (x) = f ′(x), f ′(x) = f ′′(x) ∣∣ x)+ Pr( f (x) = f ′(x), f ′(x) = f ′′(x) ∣∣ x)
 Pr
(
f (x) = f ′(x) ∣∣ x)+ Pr( f ′(x) = f ′′(x) ∣∣ x),
and therefore
d
(
f , f ′′
)= Ex∼F X [Pr( f (x) = f ′′(x) ∣∣ x)] Ex∼F X [Pr( f (x) = f ′(x) ∣∣ x)+ Pr( f ′(x) = f ′′(x) ∣∣ x)]
= Ex∼F X
[
Pr
(
f (x) = f ′(x) ∣∣ x)]+Ex∼F X [Pr( f ′(x) = f ′′(x) ∣∣ x)]= d( f , f ′)+ d( f ′, f ′′).
Thus the triangle inequality holds. 
Lemma B.3.
∑
i∈I
wiRI (ci, F ) =
∑
i
∑
j
wiw jd(ci, f j).
Proof.
∑
i∈I
wiRI (ci, F ) =
∑
i
wiRI (ci, F ) =
∑
i
wi
(∑
j
w jR j(ci, F )
)
=
∑
i
∑
j
wiw jd(ci, f j). 
Lemma B.4.
∑
i
∑
j
wiw jd( f i, f j) (2− 2wmin)r∗.
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i
∑
j
wiw jd( f i, f j) =
∑
i
∑
j =i
wiw jd( f i, f j) (since d( f i, f i) = 0)

∑
i
∑
j =i
wiw j
(
d
(
f i, c
∗)+ d(c∗, f j)) (triangle inequality)
=
∑
i
wid
(
f i, c
∗)∑
j =i
w j +
∑
i
wi
∑
j =i
w jd
(
f j, c
∗)
=
∑
i
wid
(
f i, c
∗)(1− wi) +∑
i
wi
(∑
j
w jd
(
f j, c
∗)− wid( f i, c∗)
)
=
∑
i
wi
(
d
(
f i, c
∗)(1− wi) + r∗ − wid( f i, c∗))

∑
i
wi
(
d
(
f i, c
∗)(1− wmin) + r∗ − wmind( f i, c∗))
= (1− wmin)
∑
i
wi
(
d
(
f i, c
∗)+ r∗∑
i
wi − wmin
∑
i
wid
(
f i, c
∗))
= (1− wmin)r∗ + r∗ − wminr∗ = (2− 2wmin)r∗. 
Note that Eq. (14) is derived as a special case of the lemma when weights are uniform.
We can now use these lemmas to bound the approximation ratio of our mechanism in this extended setting. We begin
with the simpler, deterministic mechanism.
Theorem 4.1′ . Let |I| = n. For every concept class C and any proﬁle F , Mechanism 4 is an SP (2n− 1)-approximation mechanism.
Proof. We ﬁrst ﬁnd a lower bound on r∗:
r∗ = RI
(
c∗, F
)=∑
i∈I
wiRi
(
c∗, F
)=∑
i∈I
wid
(
c∗, f i
)
 w jd
(
c∗, f j
)
 1
n
d
(
c∗, f j
)
(since j is heaviest). (28)
Then we upper bound the risk of c j :
RI
(
HD(F ), F
)= RI (c j, F ) =∑
i∈I
wid(c j, f i) = w jd(c j, f j) +
∑
i = j
wid(c j, f i)
 w jd
(
c∗, f j
)+∑
i = j
wi
(
d
(
c j, c
∗)+ d(c∗, f i)) (from the triangle inequality)
= d(c j, c∗)∑
i = j
wi +
∑
i∈I
wid
(
c∗, f i
)= d(c j, c∗)∑
i = j
wi + r∗
 d
(
c j, c
∗)n− 1
n
+ r∗
(
w j 
1
n
)
 r∗ + n− 1
n
(
d(c j, f j) + d
(
f j, c
∗)) (triangle inequality)
 r∗ + n− 1
n
2d
(
c∗, f j
)
(from (27))
 r∗ + n− 1
n
2n · r∗ (from (28))
= r∗ + (n− 1)2r∗ = (2n− 1)r∗. 
Theorem 4.4′ . For every concept class C and for any dataset S, Mechanism 5 is an SP (3− 2wmin)-approximation mechanism, where
wmin =mini∈I wi . Moreover, if S is individually realizable, then (2− 2wmin)-approximation is guaranteed.
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RI
(
WRD(F ), F
)=∑
i∈I
wiRI (ci, F ) =
∑
i
∑
j
wiw jd( f i, c j)

∑
i
∑
j
wiw j
(
d( f i, f j) + d( f j, c j)
)
(triangle inequality)

∑
i
∑
j
wiw j
(
d( f i, f j) + d
(
f j, c
∗)) (from (27))
=
∑
i
∑
j
wiw jd( f i, f j) +
∑
j
w jd
(
f j, c
∗)∑
i
wi
 (2− 2wmin)r∗ +
∑
j
w jd
(
f j, c
∗) (from Lemma B.4)
= (2− 2wmin)r∗ +
∑
j
w jR j
(
c∗, F
)
(from (25))
= (2− 2wmin)r∗ + RI
(
c∗, F
)= (3− 2wmin)r∗.
Further, if we have an individually realizable proﬁle F ′ , then for any agent j, d( f j, c j) = R j(c j, F ′) = 0 (from (25)), in
which case
RI
(
WRD
(
F ′
)
, F ′
)=∑
i∈I
wiRI
(
ci, F
′)∑
i
∑
j
wiw jd( f i, f j) (2− 2wmin)r∗.
Thus the proof of Theorem 4.4’ (and Theorem 4.4 as a special case) is complete. 
Proposition 4.7. There is a dataset S with three agents, such that
RI
(
SRD(S), S
)
> 2.4 · r∗ >
(
3− 2
n
)
r∗.
Example B.5. We set our concept class to C = {c−, c+}. Assume w.l.o.g. that an agent that is indifferent between the concepts
dictates the c− concept. Let S1, S2 be all positive. S3 contains exactly half negative samples. We set agents’ weights as
follows: w1 = w2 = 0.29, and w3 = 0.42.
Observe ﬁrst that RI (c−, S) = 0.79, whereas r∗ = RI (c+, S) = 0.21. However, the SRD mechanism selects agent 3 (and
thus the concept c−) with probability of 0.42
2
0.292+0.292+0.422 ∼= 0.511. Therefore,
RI
(
SRD(S), S
)
> 0.51 · 0.79+ 0.49 · 0.21= 0.5058> 2.4 · 0.21= 2.4 · r∗,
which proves the lower bound.
Proposition B.6. There is an individually realizable dataset S with three agents, such that
RI
(
SRD(S), S
)
> 1.39 · r∗ >
(
2− 2
n
)
r∗.
Example B.7. We keep C = {c−, c+}. Let S1, S2 be all positive, and S3 be all negative. We set agents’ weights as follows:
w1 = w2 = 0.363, and w3 = 0.274.
We have that RI (c−, S) = 0.763, and r∗ = RI (c+, S) = 0.274. The SRD mechanism selects agent 3 with probability of
0.2742
0.3632+0.3632+0.2742 ∼= 0.222. Therefore,
RI
(
SRD(S), S
)
> 0.222 · 0.763+ 0.778 · 0.274> 0.382> 1.39 · 0.274= 1.39 · r∗,
which proves the lower bound for the realizable case.
Theorem 4.8′ . The following hold for Mechanism 6, w.r.t. any proﬁle F :
• αw  2− 2n .
• CRD has an approximation ratio of αw + 1, i.e., at most 3− 2n .
• if S is individually realizable, then the approximation ratio is αw2 + 1, i.e., at most 2− 1n .
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Let g(x) = 12−2x . Note that g is convex. Also, since
∑
i∈I wi = 1, we have that
1
n

∑
i∈I
w2i  1. (29)
(αw)
−1 =
∑
i∈I
p′i =
∑
i∈I
wi
1
2− 2wi =
∑
i∈I
wi g(wi)
 g
(∑
i∈I
wi · wi
)
= 1
2− 2∑i∈I w2i (from Jensen’s inequality)
 1
2− 2(1/n) (from (29)),
thus αw  2− 2n .
We denote by d( f , f ′) the number of disagreements between f and f ′ . f i, ci denote the labels of agent i, and the
classiﬁer in C that is the closest to them (i.e., c ∈ C that minimizes d(c, f i)). For any c, it holds that
RI (c, F ) =
∑
i∈I
wiRi(c, F ) =
∑
i∈I
wid(c, f i).
Note that for all i, d(ci, c∗) 2d( f i, c∗), since otherwise c∗ is closer to f i than ci .
RI
(
CRD(F ), F
)=∑
i∈I
piRI (ci, F ) =
∑
i∈I
pi
∑
j∈I
w jd(ci, f j)
=
∑
i∈I
(∑
j =i
piw jd(ci, f j) + piwid(ci, f i)
)

∑
i∈I
(∑
j =i
piw j
(
d
(
ci, c
∗)+ d(c∗, f j))+ piwid(c∗, f i)
)
=
∑
i∈I
pid
(
ci, c
∗)∑
j =i
w j +
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
piw jd
(
c∗, f j
)
= αw
∑
i∈I
wi
2(1− wi)d
(
ci, c
∗)(1− wi) +∑
j∈I
w jd
(
c∗, f j
)∑
i∈I
pi
 αw
∑
i∈I
wi
2
2d
(
f i, c
∗)+∑
j∈I
w jd
(
c∗, f j
)
= (αw + 1)
∑
j∈I
w jd
(
c∗, f j
)= (αw + 1)RI(c∗, F )

(
3− 2
n
)
r∗.
Now, in the realizable case, f i = ci for all i.
RI
(
CRD(F ), F
)=∑
i∈I
piRI (ci, F ) =
∑
i∈I
pi
∑
j∈I
w jd( f i, f j) =
∑
i∈I
pi
∑
j =i
w jd( f i, f j)

∑
i∈I
∑
j =i
piw j
(
d
(
f i, c
∗)+ d( f j, c∗)) (T.I.)
=
∑
i∈I
pid
(
f i, c
∗)∑
j =i
w j +
∑
i∈I
pi
∑
j =i
w jd
(
f j, c
∗)
=
∑
i∈I
pid
(
f i, c
∗)(1− wi) +∑
i∈I
pi
(
r∗(F ) − wid
(
f i, c
∗))
= αw
∑ wi
2(1− wi)d
(
f i, c
∗)(1− wi) + r∗(F ) −∑ piwid( f i, c∗)
i∈I i∈I
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2
∑
i∈I
wid
(
f i, c
∗)+ r∗(F ) −∑
i∈I
piwid
(
f i, c
∗)
= αw
2
r∗(F ) + r∗(F ) −
∑
i∈I
piwid
(
f i, c
∗)

(
αw
2
+ 1
)
r∗(F )
(
2− 1
n
)
r∗(F ),
which completes the proof. 
Theorem 4.9. The following hold for Mechanism 7:
• βw  1− 2n .• RRD has an approximation ratio of at most 4, and at least 3 (in the worst case).
• if S is individually realizable, then the approximation ratio is 1+ βw , i.e., at most 2− 2n .
Proof. Let q(x) = 11−2x . Note that q is convex.
(βw)
−1 =
∑
i∈I
p′i =
∑
i∈I
wi
1
1− 2wi =
∑
i∈I
wiq(wi)
 q
(∑
i∈I
wi · wi
)
= 1
1− 2∑i∈I w2i (from Jensen’s inequality)
 1
1− 2(1/n) (from (29)),
thus βw  1− 2n .
For the upper bound, we will need the following.
Lemma B.8. For all i ∈ I , pi  2wi .
Proof. Let h(x) = x1−2x . Note that h is convex. Thus by Jensen’s inequality
1
n− 1
∑
j =i
h(w j) h
(
1
n− 1
∑
j =i
w j
)
= h
(
1− wi
n− 1
)
. (30)
Next,
∑
j∈I
w j
1− 2w j =
wi
1− 2wi +
∑
j =i
w j
1− 2w j =
wi
1− 2wi +
∑
j =i
h(w j)
 wi
1− 2wi + (n− 1)h
(
1− wi
n− 1
)
(by Eq. (30))
= wi
1− 2wi + (n− 1)
1−wi
n−1
1− 21−win−1
= wi
1− 2wi +
1− wi
1− 21−win−1
 wi
1− 2wi +
1/2
1− 2 1/2n−1
= wi
1− 2wi +
1
2n−2n−1
>
wi
1− 2wi +
1
2
.
Therefore,
pi = βwp′i =
(∑
j∈I
w j
1− 2w j
)−1 wi
1− 2wi <
1
wi
1−2wi + 12
· wi
1− 2wi
= wi
wi + 1−2wi2
= wi
wi − wi + 12
= 2wi . 
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RI
(
RRD(S), S
)=∑
i∈I
piRI (ci, S) =
∑
i∈I
pid
(
ci, c
∗)∑
j =i
w j +
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
piw jd
(
c∗, f j
)
= βw
∑
i∈I
wi
1− 2wi d
(
ci, c
∗)(1− wi) +∑
j∈I
w jd
(
c∗, f j
)∑
i∈I
pi
 βw
∑
i∈I
2wi(1− wi)
1− 2wi d
(
f i, c
∗)+ r∗(S)
= βw
∑
i∈I
(
wi(1− 2wi)
1− 2wi d
(
f i, c
∗)+ wi
1− 2wi d
(
f i, c
∗))+ r∗(S)
= βw
∑
i∈I
wid
(
f i, c
∗)+ βw∑
i∈I
wi
1− 2wi d
(
f i, c
∗)+ r∗(S)
= βwr∗(S) + βw
∑
i∈I
wi
1− 2wi d
(
f i, c
∗)+ r∗(S)∑
i∈I
pid
(
f i, c
∗)+ 2r∗(S)
 2
∑
i∈I
wid
(
f i, c
∗)+ 2r∗(S) = 2r∗(S) + 2r∗(S) = 4r∗(S).
In the realizable case, recall that f i = ci for all i.
RI
(
RRD(S), S
)=∑
i∈I
piRI (ci, S) =
∑
i∈I
pi
∑
j∈I
w jd( f i, f j) =
∑
i∈I
pi
∑
j =i
w jd( f i, f j)

∑
i∈I
∑
j =i
piw j
(
d
(
f i, c
∗)+ d( f j, c∗)) (T.I.)
=
∑
i∈I
pid
(
f i, c
∗)∑
j =i
w j +
∑
i∈I
pi
∑
j =i
w jd
(
f j, c
∗)
=
∑
i∈I
pid
(
f i, c
∗)(1− wi) +∑
i∈I
pi
(
r∗(S) − wid
(
f i, c
∗))
= βw
∑
i∈I
wi
1− 2wi d
(
f i, c
∗)(1− wi) − βw∑
i∈I
wi
1− 2wi wid
(
f i, c
∗)+ r∗(S)
= βw
∑
i∈I
wi(1− 2wi)
1− 2wi d
(
f i, c
∗)+ r∗(S)
= βw
∑
i∈I
wid
(
f i, c
∗)+ r∗(S) = βwr∗(S) + r∗(S)
= (1+ βw)r∗(S)
(
2− 2
n
)
r∗(S),
which proves the upper bound. 
B.2. Proofs of generalization results (Section 4.3)
As in Section 3.3, we distinguish the notation R(c) (the risk w.r.t. the ﬁxed input distribution) from Rˆ(c, S) (the empirical
risk, w.r.t. the sampled dataset S). For the proofs in this section, we will also need the following fundamental result from
machine learning theory.
Theorem B.9 (Vapnik and Chervonenkis [41]). Let m be s.t.
m >
VC
2
log
(
VC
2δ
)
.
Let S be a dataset that contains m data points sampled i.i.d. from a distributionD ∈ (X ×Y). Then with probability of at least 1− δ,
∀c ∈ C (∣∣R(c) − Rˆ(c, S)∣∣< ) (31)
where VC is a constant which depends only on the concept class C , and not on the distribution D or on any other property of the
problem.
152 R. Meir et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 186 (2012) 123–156VC is known as the VC-dimension of C , introduced in [41]. We do not give a formal deﬁnition of VC here. However,
detailed and accessible overviews of both VC theory and PAC learning are abundant (for example, [12]). While VC may be
very large, or even inﬁnite in some cases, it is known to be ﬁnite for many commonly used concept classes (e.g., linear
classiﬁers).
Theorem 4.10. Assume all agents are -truthful, and let C be any concept class with a bounded dimension. For any  > 0, there is k
(polynomial in 1 and ln(n)) s.t. if at least k data points are sampled, then the expected risk of Mechanism 8 is at most (3− 2n ) · rmin + .
Proof. Let Si = 〈X, Yi(X)〉 be the partial dataset of agent i, with its true private labels. Denote by Q i = Q i() the event that
∀c ∈ C (∣∣Ri(c) − Rˆi(c, S)∣∣< ). (32)
We emphasize that Q i is a property of S , i.e., for some random samples S the event Q i holds, whereas for others it does
not hold. Our proof sketch can now be reformulated as follows:
(a) Q i happens for all i simultaneously with high probability.
(b) Whenever Q i occurs, agent i will report truthfully (under the -truthfulness assumption).
(c) When all Q i occur, the risk of Mechanism 8 is bounded by (3− 2n ) · rmin +  .
(d) Otherwise the risk can be high, but this has a small effect on the total expected risk.
Let δ > 0. As Si is an i.i.d. random sample from Di , then from Theorem B.9 every Q i occurs with probability of at least
1 − δ (provided that there are enough samples). Also, from the union bound the probability of the event ∀ jQ j is at least
1− δ′ , where δ = δ′n .
Lemma B.10. If Q i occurs, then agent i can gain at most 2 by lying.
Proof. Assume agent i is selected by the mechanism, otherwise it is trivially true.
We denote by cˆi ∈ C the concept returned by the mechanism when i reports truthfully, i.e., cˆi = argminc∈C Rˆi(c, Si).
Let any c′ ∈ C ,
Ri(cˆi) − Ri
(
c′
)= Ri(cˆi) − Rˆi(cˆi, Si) + Rˆi(cˆi, Si) − Ri(c′)

∣∣Ri(cˆi) − Rˆi(cˆi, Si)∣∣+ ∣∣Rˆi(c′, Si)− Ri(c′)∣∣ (since cˆi is empirically optimal)
<  +  = 2 (from (32)). 
By Lemma B.10, i cannot gain more than 2 by reporting c′ . By taking  < ′2 , we complete the proof of parts (a) and (b)
from the proof sketch.
Now, for part (c), we assume ∀iQ i . Thus, from Lemma B.10 and the -truthfulness assumption, all agents are truthful
(i.e., S = S).
Lemma B.11. If S holds that Q i occurs for all i ∈ I , then
RˆI
(
c∗(S), S
)
 rmin + ,
where c∗(S) = argminc∈C RˆI (c, S).
Proof. For any c ∈ C , |Ri(c) − Rˆi(c, Si)| <  , from Eq. (32). Therefore
RˆI
(
c∗(S), S
)
 RˆI (c, S) =
∑
i∈I
pi Rˆi(c, S) =
∑
i∈I
pi Rˆi(c, Si) <
∑
i∈I
pi
(
Ri(c) + 
)= RI (c) + ,
and in particular RˆI (c∗(S), S) < rmin +  . 
We now bound the expected risk of the mechanism. We denote by cM(S) the (random) classiﬁer that is returned by
Mechanism 6 on the input S . For any random variable A, EM[A | S] is the expectation of A over the random dictator
selection for a ﬁxed dataset S . Similarly, ES [A | i] is the expectation of A over the random sampling, given that i is the
selected dictator.
E
[
RI
(
cM(S)
) ∣∣ ∀ jQ j]
= ES
[
EM
[
RI
(
cM(S)
) ∣∣ S] ∣∣ ∀ jQ j]= EM[ES[RI(cM(S)) ∣∣ i,∀ jQ j]] (changing the order of randomizations)
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∑
i∈I
piES
[
RI
(
cˆi(S)
) ∣∣ i,∀ jQ j]

∑
i∈I
piES
[
RˆI
(
cˆi(S), Si
)+  ∣∣ i,∀ jQ j] (from (32))
=
∑
i∈I
piES
[
RˆI
(
cˆi(S), Si
) ∣∣ i,∀ jQ j]+ 
= EM
[
ES
[
RˆI
(
cM(S), S
) ∣∣ i,∀ jQ j]]+ 
 EM
[
ES
[(
3− 2
n
)
RˆI
(
c∗(S), S
) ∣∣ i,∀ jQ j
]]
+  (from Theorem 4.8)
 EM
[
ES
[(
3− 2
n
)
(rmin + )
∣∣ i,∀ jQ j
]]
+  (from Lemma B.11)
=
(
3− 2
n
)
(rmin + ) +  
(
3− 2
n
)
· rmin + 4 =
(
3− 2
n
)
rmin + ′,
which proves part (c) of the proof sketch.
Finally, we bound the total risk of the mechanism, taking part (d) into account.
RI (C˜RD) = E
[
RI
(
cM(S)
)]= ES[EM[RI(cM(S)) ∣∣ S]]
= Pr(∀ jQ j)ES
[
EM
[
RI
(
cM(S)
) ∣∣ S] ∣∣ ∀ jQ j]
+ Pr(¬∀ jQ j)ES
[
EM
[
RI
(
cM(S)
) ∣∣ S] ∣∣¬∀ jQ j]
 ES
[
EM
[
RI
(
cM(S)
) ∣∣ S] ∣∣ ∀ jQ j]+ δ′ · 1
= ES
[
EM
[
RI
(
cM(S)
) ∣∣ S] ∣∣ ∀ jQ j]+ δ′ (since all agents are truthful in this case)

(
3− 2
n
)
rmin + δ′ + ′ =
(
3− 2
n
)
rmin + ′′,
as required. 
We conclude by computing the exact number of samples needed by Mechanism 8 under the -truthfulness assumption.
Lemma B.12. If k > 64 VC
2
log(256 VC ·n
3
), then
RI (C˜RD)
(
3− 2
n
)
rmin + .
Proof. From Theorem B.9, if |S j | > VC(∗)2 log( VC(∗)2δ∗ ), then Pr(¬Q j(∗)) < δ∗ and from the union bound it holds that
Pr
(∃ j ∈ I,¬Q j(∗))∑
j∈I
¬Q j
(
∗
)
< nδ∗.
Taking ∗ < 8 and δ
∗ < 4n , and unfolding all the residues we used in the proof, we get that
RI (C˜RD)
(
3− 2
n
)
rmin 
(
3− 2
n
)
rmin + 4∗ + 2nδ∗
<
(
3− 2
n
)
rmin + 48 + 2n

4n
=
(
3− 2
n
)
rmin + ,
while
VC
(∗)2
log
(
VC
(∗)2δ∗
)
= VC
(/8)2
log
(
VC
(/8)2(/4n)
)
= 64 VC
2
log
(
256
VC · n
3
)
. 
Theorem 4.11. Assume all agents are purely rational, and let C be any concept class with a bounded dimension. For any  > 0, there is
a k (polynomial only in 1 ) s.t. if at least k data points are sampled, then the expected risk of Mechanism 8 is at most (3− 2 )rmin +  . n
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D =∑ni=1 wiDi . We can alternatively deﬁne rmin as the minimal risk of any concept w.r.t. the distribution D, i.e., rmin =
infc∈C E(x,y)∼D[[[c(x) = y]]]. We would like to analyze the outcome of Mechanism 8 and compare the empirical risk to the
actual risk. However, we have a technical problem with doing so directly, since Si (as deﬁned in the proof of Theorem 4.10)
is sampled i.i.d. from Di , but not from D.
In order to prove the theorem, we introduce a virtual mechanism (see Mechanism 9). This mechanism generates a truthful
dataset S , which can be used as an i.i.d. sample from the joint distribution D.
Mechanism 9 The Virtual Learning Mechanism
Sample k data points i.i.d. from DX (assume we get the same dataset X as in Mechanism 8).
for each point x ∈ X do
Select agent i with probability wi .
Add 〈x j , Yi(x)〉 to S .
end for
return c∗(S) = erm(S).
The output of Mechanism 9, c∗(S), is the best concept (in C) for the real dataset S . Note that S is an i.i.d. sample from D,
but an actual mechanism such as Mechanism 8 cannot have access to the real labels Yi—hence the term virtual mechanism.
We denote by T = T () the event
RI
(
c∗(S)
)
< rmin + 2. (33)
Similarly to Q j in the previous proof, T is a property of S , i.e., its occurrence depends only on the sampling.
Lemma B.13. If k = k(δ, ) is large enough then
Pr(¬T ) < δ.
Proof. This is an immediate corollary of Theorem B.9. As c∗ = argminc∈C RˆI (c, S), C is of a bounded dimension and S is
sampled i.i.d. from D, then for any c ∈ C
RI
(
c∗(S)
)
< RˆI
(
c∗(S), S
)+   RˆI (c, S) +  < RI (c) +  + 
holds with probability of at least 1− δ, for a large enough k. In particular,
Pr(T ) = Pr(RI(c∗(S))< rmin + 2)> 1− δ. 
It is still not clear how to approximate c∗(S), as our mechanism only has access to S . For that purpose, we deﬁne a
new concept class CX ⊆ C as the projection of C on X . Formally, let HX ⊆H be the class of all dichotomies of X , i.e., all h
s.t. h : X → {−,+},19 then CX = C ∩ HX . In other words, CX contains all dichotomies of X that are also allowed by C .
Denote by Si the dataset with the reported labels of agent i, and by cˆi the best concept w.r.t. to this dataset. That is,
Si = {〈x, Y i(x)〉}x∈X and cˆi = argminc∈C Rˆi(c, Si). Observe that c∗(S) ∈ CX and cˆ j ∈ CX for all agents. This is the case since
both S, S j are labeled versions of the set X . Thus any classiﬁer that is computed w.r.t. S or S j is a dichotomy of X (which
minimizes some function that depends on the labels). We deﬁne c˜ = argminc∈CX RI (c). Clearly RI (c˜) RI (c∗(S)), since c∗(S)
is also a member of CX . Thus when T occurs, the inequality
RI (c˜) < rmin + 2 (34)
also holds, directly as a special case of (33).
We next show how to approximate c˜ using the generalized variant of Theorem 4.8, as it appears in the appendix.
Consider a proﬁle F = 〈D1, . . . ,Dn〉. This is a valid proﬁle with shared inputs; thus for any concept c ∈ C , R(c) = R(c, F ) for
private and global risk alike.
Lemma B.14. Let j be the selected dictator, then
cˆ j = argmin
c∈CX
R j(c) = argmin
c∈CX
R j(c, F ).
Proof. Recall that cˆ j ≡ argminc∈C Rˆ j(c, S j). Since we assumed j is purely rational, he will always label all examples in X in
a way that will minimize his private risk. From the way Mechanism 8 works, only concepts in CX may be returned, and for
any c ∈ CX , there is a labeling of X s.t. c is returned. This labeling Y (c) is simply ∀x ∈ X (y(x) = c(x)). Thus argminc∈CX R j(c)
is the best that agent j can hope for, and he can also achieve it by reporting the appropriate labels Y j . 
19 Put differently, HX is a partition of H to equivalence classes, according to their outcome on X ⊆X .
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j∈I
p jRI (cˆ j, F )
(
3− 2
n
)
r∗(F ) =
(
3− 2
n
)
RI (c˜). (35)
To see why this holds, observe that the left term is the expected risk of Mechanism 6 when the input is the proﬁle F
and the concept class CX ; and c˜ is the globally optimal classiﬁer for this input. We emphasize that Eq. (35) always holds,
independently of the sampling or selection.
Finally, we bound the risk of the result concept:
RI (C˜RD) = ES
[
EM
[
RI (cM)
∣∣ S]]
= Pr(T )ES
[
EM
[
RI (cM)
∣∣ S] ∣∣ T ]+ Pr(¬T )ES[EM[RI (cM) ∣∣ S] ∣∣¬T ]
 ES
[
EM
[
RI (cM)
∣∣ S] ∣∣ T ]+ δ · 1 (from Lemma B.13)
= ES
[∑
j∈I
w jRI
(
cˆ j(S)
) ∣∣ T]+ δ
 ES
[(
3− 2
n
)
RI
(
c˜(S)
) ∣∣ T]+ δ (from (35))
<
(
3− 2
n
)
ES
[
(rmin + 2)
∣∣ T ]+ δ (from (34))
=
(
3− 2
n
)
(rmin + 2) + δ =
(
3− 2
n
)
rmin + 6 + δ.
By taking δ =  = ′7 , the proof is complete.
Similarly to Lemma B.12, it follows from Theorem B.9 that taking
k > 49
VC
2
log
(
343
VC
3
)
is suﬃcient for Mechanism 8 to work well under the pure rationality assumption. 
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